Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

U.S. Resumes Immigration Agreement

FL201731 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1715 GMT 20 Nov 87

[Text] Cuba and the United States have decided to resume the immigration agreement and continue discussing radio broadcasts during talks held between government representatives from the two countries in this capital. The text of the agreement delivered to *Prensa Latina* by Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon says the following:

Representatives of the Republic of Cuba and the United States of America met to discuss immigration and radio broadcast issues. They agreed to resume immediately the 1984 immigration agreement in its entirety. They also agreed to continue negotiations on medium-wave radio broadcasts beamed from one country to listeners of another so that a mutually acceptable arrangement can be reached. Details of this report will follow.

TANJUG Interviews President Fidel Castro

LD182222 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0957 GMT 15 Nov 87

[Excerpts of interview with President Fidel Castro by Yugoslav journalists Mladen Arnautovic and Dusan Dakovic—date and place not given]

[Text] Havana, 15 Nov (TANJUG)—"In Cuba there is growing interest in Yugoslavia, and the recent visit of President Lazar Mojsov marked the best moment of our relations."

This was stated by Fidel Castro, president of the Councils of State and Ministers in a spontaneous and direct interview lasting several hours with Mladen Arnautovic, chief and executive editor of TANJUG and Dusan Dakovic, TANJUG's correspondent in Cuba. Today we are publishing the most important parts of this interview, the first which the Cuban statesman has given to Yugoslav news media.

Question: How do you assess the present relations between Cuba and Yugoslavia? What are the prospects for such relations?

Castro: These relations have advanced significantly in recent times. Our relations have been constantly improving for the past 10 years, since my first visit to Yugoslavia and the talks I had with President Tito at Brioni. That was a useful visit; I was given a great deal of hospitality. After that, President Tito and I would meet at gatherings of the nonaligned countries. These contacts contributed a great deal to better mutual understanding between our two countries and their leaderships. In Harare I had very warm talks with Yugoslav President Hasani and I was invited to visit Yugoslavia. That visit took place last year. I spent several days in Belgrade. I was shown very warm hospitality on that occasion and have lasting memories of it. Our relations are progressing intensively, both in the political and economic spheres. We can also say that the visit of your President Lazar Mojsov to Cuba was particularly useful. I believe that our relations are very good, very firm, and I am sure that they will continue to improve...

As for our economic relations, we talked about many specific matters in connection with trade, about scientific-technical cooperation, and industrial cooperation. We established that there are many areas in which we can have exchanges and cooperate....

We admire the Yugoslav people and Yugoslav heroism. I also remember that Che Guevara was one of the first Cubans to visit Yugoslavia after the revolution. He spoke with much admiration about your country! His desire to acquaint himself with the experiences of the Yugoslavs took him there. There are quite a few articles by him on the subject.

Question: Everywhere in the world socialism is seeking new solutions to its old problems. How is this process taking place here, where it was said at one of the recent plenums of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee that this is an historic turnabout?

Castro: What you say is right, that all socialist countries are seeking new formulas for the progress of socialism. The situation in every society should be subjected to analysis. Every process, every experience should be analyzed.... Socialism has still to be developed and there is much progress to be made.

We have had up until now differing experiences. First we had a period when no importance was attached to material stimuli, when stimuli of a moral nature held sway exclusively. We call it a period of idealism. At that time we wanted to progress too rapidly. Proceeding from this experience and wanting to overcome these problems, in 1975 we adopted a system based on economic accountability, in which a relationship is established between the norm and pay, and which rests on certain economic mechanisms: viability, profits, incentives, bank credits, interest rates, and so on.

Previously we had a system in which a dock worker who loaded 6 tons would earn the same as one who loaded 10 tons. This is why we accepted this other system, based on the experience of the majority of socialist countries. Now, 10 or 11 years later, we have also recognized the negative aspects of an economic system which gives priority almost exclusively to capitalist mechanisms of material stimulation and ignores other factors. Certain traditions, such as voluntarism and the spirit of solidarity, the custom whereby our citizens volunteer for society every Sunday, have completely died out.

Political awareness was also growing weak because we were relying too much on material stimuli. We wanted to resolve all problems with money—pay, with an incentive—which led to the abuse of these mechanisms. There was too much overtime, while at the same time the basic work time was not being used properly. Enterprises were competing over which would attract the better work force, introducing very low norms, which did not change even after the introduction of new technology. We had cases where the norm was exceeded by two or three times, where there were very high salaries based neither on productivity nor on production. Construction enterprises, for example, were interested in beginning to build a project, but not in completing it, because the greatest productivity was achieved in the first phase when very productive machines are used. The relationship between quality and quantity was established and only quantity was paid for. Thus we arrived at deformations of various kinds.

Deformations also occurred on the free peasant market. It should never have been allowed to be set up. Our situation here was quite different from that in some socialist countries where the peasant farmer owns half a hectare of land. Our agriculture is characterized by the fact that 85 percent of the land belongs to state enterprises, which are the main producers of milk, meat, eggs, rice, and sugarcane, which is the basic agricultural product in our country. Individual peasant farmers, who hold 15 percent of the land, nevertheless created a spontaneous cooperative movement, because we never applied coercion to drive peasants into cooperatives. Almost half the peasant farmers organized themselves into cooperatives. But there remained 10,000 or more farmers, of whom some have 60 or even 65 hectares of land. On the free market, with 65 hectares, large and exaggerated earnings were realized, and the farmers were not delivering their products to the state. We arrived at a disproportion; the general supplies within the country were not improving.

Question: What are your immediate aims in the process of overcoming these negative factors?

Castro: We have waged a struggle to rid the system of planning and management of all negative aspects, all deformations. However, this does not mean that we will abandon the system of economic accountability. There is no alternative to this. We will continue to use certain economic mechanisms, because that is our real need. We will maintain remuneration according to work effort, in all areas where that is possible; for example, in harvesting sugar cane and where there is a great deal of physical work, where norms exist. However, in hospitals, where treatment is, of course, free, some other system must be sought; also at the universities, in schools, and in scientific research centers. A revision of the entire system is underway, including the whole system of norms, from elementary ones to factors that influence the growth of production costs, the consumption of raw materials, the volume of the work force, production, productivity...

Concern for the working man is also very important. Experience has shown us that where there exists concern for man, the appropriate relations in work collectives, you can achieve everything you want with the workers.

In a word, we are now walking on both feet. During that first period, we were going along on one leg, the left leg, and then after that again on only one leg, but the right one. Now we are endeavoring to proceed on both feet, in order to be more efficient, but at the same time avoiding the myth that economic mechanisms alone can build socialism. They should assist the building of socialism.

We will also encourage open criticism, public criticism and broad discussion in the press and in other public media on all existing problems. This is our approach in everything, because whereever there is a little digging about it can be seen that there is a problem. This is why we have also strengthened political work. The party is in the midst of a process of rectification (the correction of errors), but not with the intention of replacing the administration but of supervising the implementation of the established line, the mistakes of which I have spoken—poor quality, the factory which produces 30 or 40 articles but should produce 100—all this is not permissible and the party should mobilize the masses...This is one of the characteristics of our process of rectification.

The implementation of the planning and management system is in the hands of technocrats and theoreticians who had prepared formulas that they proposed to the party as matters within the competence of experts. However, we worked on the assumption that such issues cannot depend only on the experts and that the Politburo and the party must examine the entire system on the basis of political, and not technocratic criteria. In fact, the experts can ruin the revolution. This danger exists. A strata of technocrats of a bookish culture has grown up; they believe they possess amazing formulae for sorting out everything. However, experts should be the instruments of revolutionary activity, while decisions should be political.

Of course, every country should proceed from its own experiences and its own positive reality. I respect what every country is doing. I believe that every country knows best what it needs to do and no one can be the judge of others. This concept and this tendency to judge what others are doing has created a great deal of trouble in the international revolutionary movement. For this reason no one should judge others, everyone should be his own judge and decide on his own on things he is doing. I think that this is very much in keeping with the principles of independence and self-orientation and I also think that this is in keeping with the principle of pluralism. This is the real interpretation of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. We can no longer maintain the concept that there exists only one school and only one interpretation.

Question: The unavoidable topic in the interview with you is certainly the situation in Latin America. How far, in your opinion, did the democratic processes on the Green Continent get?

Castro: In the course of the past years, democratic processes have progressed in Latin America. This is the objective reality. I think that the process in which military regimes are losing prestige is continuing. The foreign debt of $300 million from 1984 and 1985 contributed to this process. Soldiers could no longer reign and they yielded their power to civilians. Not the power, but the administration. The army always reserves for itself a certain degree of power behind the throne, with a certain degree of right to veto and the force of intervention in political processes. The democratic process and the democratic opening coincide with the crisis and are partly the consequence of it.

Therefore, two problems exist: the economic crisis and the foreign debt. These factors coincide and this, I believe, represents a threat to the stability of this process.

The economic and social situation in Latin America is very serious. I think we can make some comparisons. Let us recall the Cuban revolution from 1959-1960. In this period, Latin America had half of its present population and no foreign debt, while basic products, with the exception of petroleum, were sold at considerably higher prices. The United States, concerned about a possibility of forceful revolutionary changes, invented an Alliance for Progress. This was an intelligent idea of Kennedy's: to initiate reforms in order to prevent a revolution, to offer economic aid in order to prevent social and economic disturbances which would lead to revolution. The Alliance for Progress was set up in 1961, after the attempted invasion on Giron beach. This was Kennedy's reply to the Cuban revolution and a part of his strategy to isolate the Cuban revolution.

Today, 26 years later, the population of Latin America has increased two-fold and health problems, unemployment, and the housing crisis have all been severely exacerbated. Much more than before, in all national economies there exists galloping inflation. Apart from that, they owe $400 billion, which is 20 times more than what Kennedy offered them in the 10-year period, during which they had half of the population and much fewer problems.

If Kennedy was then afraid of social changes, then what sort of fears can exist today? These countries are in the worst objective conditions. The elements of destabilization and explosive factors are becoming concentrated. No one can know what kind of disturbances can occur. There will be no solutions unless awareness of these problems exists . For this reason all this has led to the greater independence of all Latin American countries' governments. The Latin American governments literally carried out orders from Washington 26 years ago. They all broke off relations with Cuba and joined the blockade of Cuba. All except Mexico. Today there is far greater feeling of dignity, independence, and sovereignty in all Latin American countries and almost all Latin American governments. This is a new phenomenon. However, does anyone have an answer to the question of what the prospects are? Latin America is lagging behind. National per capita income is dropping. Social problems have accumulated in a brutal way. Nobody knows what will result from these circumstances unless the problems are solved, unless a new international economic system is really established, unless the arms race is halted, unless the resources intended for Third World countries are no longer squandered, and unless the foreign debt problem is settled.

Question: Speaking about the Latin American debt, you have recently said that Latin American politicians "would be responsible before history" because they failed to become united in facing the most serious problem of the world.

Castro: True, because there has never before been such a critical situation, just as a problem never existed before which would have an effect on all the Latin American countries in such a direct way, not even excluding the oil exporting countries. This is proof, perhaps, of the seriousness of the crisis, as these countries, such as Venezuela, which exports a million and a half barrels of oil daily with a foreign debt of over $30 billion, have serious problems. Here also it is not only a question of debt, which is burdening them, but also of unequal conditions of exchange, protectionism, dumping, financial manipulations, and the flight of capital. For this reason, the foreign debt is a factor that could have united Latin American countries in a joint action.

I was convinced that had some important country in 1985 engaged in a battle, other countries would have followed it. But this is not sufficient, because we must wage two battles united: the battle against the foreign debt and the battle for the establishment of a new international economic system. We think that if the debt problem were overcome, for instance in 10 years, then the situation would be the same as today or even worse without a new international economic system. Our thesis is that state-creditors should take over the Third World debt and, from allocations for armament, settle this debt in their banks; and the state-debtors would pay out the countervalue in their own currencies. With 15 or 20 percent of resources for armament, two funds can be set up: for eliminating the debt and for stimulating development by means of establishing a new international economic system. This is not a matter of charity to these countries or of gifts, but of the fact that their raw materials and other basic products should be justly paid for.

Question: How do you assess the present world situation? More precisely, how do you view the peace efforts in Central America, southern Africa, and the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Castro: I will answer this question in order of importance. First, on the Soviet-U.S. agreement. It is the question of an historic event and merit cannot be attributed to the new Soviet policy. Soviets made significant concessions. But, this is the beginning, a way toward achieving ambitious goals. The achieved agreement refers to a small part of nuclear arms and the aim is—and this is the essence of efforts exerted by the USSR—to achieve a 50-percent reduction in nuclear arms.

I believe that this would be an enormous step and I believe that it is possible. In my opinion, the basic barrier is in the U.S. stand concerning Star Wars. There is no doubt about the fact that if the agreement on space weapons is not signed and if the United States insists on the policy named Star Wars, the only answer will be a mass arms buildup. This would be a plot against reducing nuclear weapons.

Regional problems were also marked by progress. You have mentioned Central America and southern Africa, and I would also mention Afghanistan. Progress has been achieved in the growth of awareness on a need for finding a solution. International awareness also increased in relation to the Iran-Iraq war, as well as Southeast Asia. All this means that progress in relations between the two nuclear superpowers perhaps also contributed to the reduction of general tension and the creation of a climate that could help resolve regional problems. Changes in these regions also contribute to it.

Something happened in Central America that seemed unbelievable—the agreement between Central American countries that was supported by the other Latin American countries. This is one more proof of a tendency toward the greater independence of Latin America. I believe that Nicaragua made an enormous effort to fulfill its share of responsibilities contained in the agreement, opposing maneuvers from the United States, whose obvious intention is the sabotage of the agreement.

There are also prospects for resolving problems in southern Africa. This I can discuss, because we have been present in this conflict for 10 years now. There are possibilities for a solution. I believe that the key here is in the hands of the United States. All depends on the Washington attitude to the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] movement. If the United States is ready to observe the sovereignty of Angola and stop their aid to UNITA, I believe that this would create great possibilities for achieving a solution to the problem of Namibia, the application of resolution No 435, the stabilization of the situation, and the achievement of peace. Angola, for its part, should make a concession. I think that the main thing is that the solution is reached by means of participation of all the interested parties. But it all depends on the attitude of the U.S. Adminstration to Angola.

Question: How do you assess the present situation in the Nonaligned Movement? Can more be expected now from nonaligned countries?

Castro: I believe that this is so, I believe that we can expect more from these countries. This is reaffirmed by the problems I have already mentioned. These are international economic problems and problems in connection with seeking a solution to the arms race, while seekng a solution to disarmament. I think that it is the duty of nonaligned countries to play a very important role now. However, the movement is far larger, numerous and I would just add that it is more complex than before. It is more heterogenous now. It has more force but at the same time greater efforts are needed to gather its members for a more specific action. All the member-countries of the movement— including Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Algeria, in fact all the countries—should be aware of the time in which we live and realize that we should actively participate as protagonists, in the current international events. This is really a very big need. I think that Yugoslavia and Cuba fully agree on this. We must all ask ourselves what we should do and we should all be ready to do what is possible, but also to strive to do even more.

MINREX Note on RSB's Attacks Against Angola

FL181324 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] The Cuban Foreign Ministry [MINREX] released a note today condemning South Africa's new attacks against Angola. MINREX says the fascist Pretoria regime—imperialism's watchdog in southern Africa—reported with outrageous cynicism last weekend the unusual and shameless presence of President Pieter Botha and several of his ministers in Angolan territory. This visit was to praise the racist troops that increased their flagrant attacks against Angola in the last few weeks participating together with the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] counterrevolutionary bands in combat against the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, FAPLA.

The Cuban note says that, up to now, the insolent South African interventions in Angolan territory were supposedly justified by the persecution of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] combatants who entered Namibia from southern Angola to confront racist soldiers occupying their fatherland illegally. The reported excuse this time to conduct their repeated but now ostentatious attack against the Angolan people has been the pretext of having to confront an alleged reinforcement of Cuban and Soviet troops threatening to wipe out UNITA forces. This official version of Botha's government unequivocally shows once more that those counterrevolutionary bands thrive thanks to Pretoria's military support and the growing logistical supplies given by the United States; the puppet Savimbi does not hide this but, on the contrary, boasts about it saying that, in fact, this U.S. aid has become its main support.

This shameless intervention of the racist regime should not surprise us because from the time Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other Frontline States achieved their independence South Africa has not stopped attacking and destabilizing them. Together with the United States, it has created the decisive factors that prevent the peoples of the region to live in peace and work towards their development.

MINREX later adds that because of their racist arrogance they cannot admit that black people, whom they consider inferior, confront them with fear. Faced with this display of unwillingness to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, Cuba confirms its solidarity with Angola and the front-line countries, and its willingness to maintain its moral and material support to the People's Republic of Angola for the defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

'Wide Angle' Program on Drought

FL191403 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 17 Nov 87

["In studio" interview with Agriculture Minister Adolfo Diaz Suarez by "Wide Angle" program host Pedro Martinez Pirez—live or recorded]

[Text] [Martinez] Minister Diaz, I would like you to tell us what impact the drought has had on Cuban agriculture.

[Diaz] As the Cuban people know, we have been affected by a drought for approximately 5 years. We are basing our agricultural development on intense production; a search for better ways to use our land which, as you know, is limited in size; and we are also implementing techniques to make our land yield more. Water and irrigation play a very important role in this.

We also have land that depends strictly on nature for its water. An example of this is the land used to grow coffee and pasture. This means that these areas do not require an irrigation system, and water in those areas is not supplied by a dam or a minidam. These areas are the most affected by a drought.

During these past few years we could say that we have recorded an increase in the production of citrus and other agricultural products despite the drought. Rice production has increased. However, our water supply is just not enough. Therefore, we must say the drought has affected our agriculture in the past few years, and we could add that this year has been one of our worst years.

Despite all this, a great effort has been made in the field of agriculture this year. We could add that we have planted more than 7,030 caballerias of tubers. This amounts to 1,230 more than we planted last year, and much more than we have planted in the past 5 years. This year we also surpassed, by 1,270 caballerias, the number of caballerias planted with orchard products. This year we also strongly promoted the production of rice, and our spring crop has been one on the biggest ever. During the winter, we did not have enough water; therefore, we were able to plant only 1,870 or 1,900 caballerias of rice. During a good year, we would normally plant 2,600 or 2,700 caballerias [words indistinct]. Despite this effort, in some cases we were forced to plant some areas two or three times because the water shortage resulted in the loss of the crop.

[Martinez] Could you give us an example of this?

[Diaz] I will give you an example. This year we planted 4,500 caballerias of corn, 1,500 caballerias more than we planted last year. However, we lost more than 800 caballerias of corn because the drought damaged the crop.

The cattle industry has been greatly affected by the drought. During the 1986-87 drought, we counted 1.45 million head of cattle. Today, right in the middle of spring, we have been able to keep more that 500,000 head of cattle alive only because we are using trucks to haul the water they need. There is no other way for these animals to obtain water. We already know that for the 1987-88 dry season we will have to keep at least 1.55 million head of cattle alive at the various rice collection centers and other centers. I brought this up to give you an idea of the huge amount of work we have to do because of the drought.

[Martinez] How much water does Cuban agriculture need?

[Diaz] Well, 27 percent of the land used in agriculture needs to be irrigated. I am talking about specific products. For example, rice [words indistinct] we have only 27,000 hectares planted with rice—without water we cannot undertake major rice production; 70 percent of citrus crops are irrigated; approximately 50 percent of the 15,000 caballerias planted with tubers and orchard products is irrigated; and 70 percent of tobacco land is irrigated. The rest of the products we grow depends mainly on the rainfall. They do not have support systems; they do not have irrigation systems.

We have studied the water problem and calculated that our agriculture needs at least 18 billion cubic meters of water. However, today—although when the revolution triumphed there were only 40 million cubic meters of water in reservoirs—we have only 6 billion cubic meters of water in reserve. This is not counting our subterranean sources. As suggested by our commander in chief, we are also working on conserving our resources and saving water. This is something we began during the early days of the revolution. The fact that when the revolution triumphed we only had 40 million cubic meters of water impounded, and today we have 6 billion cubic meters can only mean that we have been working to resolve the problem. We were aware of the need for [words indistinct].

[Martinez] Is it true that Cuban agriculture uses up approximately 75 percent of available water?

[Diaz] Approximately.

[Martinez] Minister, do you think that the agricultural sector can also contribute to the water works project drive?

[Diaz] Of course. There are two ways we can do this. First, by using water efficiently, thus conserving water. The second way could be by changing our irrigation techniques. These techniques could be improved. We are still using systems like flooding and sprinkling. These are not the best systems. Some of these systems may be good, but too much water is used. We are currently developing a plan, with the help of the national industry, to build more efficient irrigation equipment in Cuba. For example, one of these devices would save at least 50 percent of the water that a conventional system currently uses. These conventional techniques are good, but we cannot save water with them. Another way to save water is by making sure that not a single extra drop of water is used when irrigating our crops. We must make sure that unnecessary ditches are not dug and filled with water. We must use only the water we need.

[Martinez] Do you have a way to determine next year's cattle situation?

[Diaz] Yes. One of our biggest problems is the cattle sector which needs water not only to irrigate pastures but also to keep animals alive. We have a plan that will be and must be implemented in the next few months. We have plans to build more than 1,400 windmills. We have already begun excavating and the windmills are being built. We are also digging more than 1,600 wells, and we continue to dig wells. We are doing all this in an attempt to resolve the serious water problem we face in the cattle sector.

[Martinez] We keep hearing about the water works drive; it has become a national drive. Water conservation is constantly stressed. Does this mean there was a time when this was not being done? Does the Ministry of Agriculture feel it also failed to promote the importance of saving water?

[Diaz] Yes, I think we did. We are also to blame. Our country is a very narrow strip of land and it does not have mighty rivers. Our need for water should have been, should be, and should continue to be, one of the main concerns for the Cuban farmer, especially for the Ministry of Agriculture. I think we are also to blame for abandoning the idea of saving water and for not anticipating the future. We were aware that something had to be done; however, nothing was done.

Currently, much work is being done to improve this situation. We have important projects underway. The ministry, the construction workers, and the water works sector have implemented several joint projects. We have been working together to determine the appropriate location of dams, and we are also working on the construction of minidams, water sheds, wells, and windmills. As I said earlier we will have to build at least [words indistinct] in the next few months, and we are currently reorganizing this plan which involves the whole agricultural sector.

Haiti

Station Cites Dominican Paper on Relations

FL192125 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] The Dominican newspaper *El Nacional* reports a certain coolness in the relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic after the Dominican Government sent for its ambassador in Port-au-Prince, General (Oscar Padrilla Medrano), retired. Let's listen to (Guzman Bissainthe):

[Begin (Bissainthe) recording] The Dominican Foreign Ministry and the Haitian Embassy have affirmed that relations between the two countries are cordial. However, *El Nacional* says this does not really seem to be the case. .

Diplomatic discretion has been unable to prevent a certain amount of distaste on the part of Haitian Government authorities for the way the Dominican Government has handled the matter of illegal Haitian immigrants here in the Dominican Republic, the paper notes.

An EFE report of the death of Dominican (Silfredo Antonio Sanchez) in Haiti has led the Dominican Government to recall its ambassador in Port-au-Prince, Gen Oscar Pavilla Medrano, retired.

Relations between the two governments began to cool when President Joaquin Balaguer accused the Haitians not too long ago of destroying Dominican forests. These views are considered absurd in Haitian diplomatic circles, because the Dominican Government should have sent notes concerning this matter to the Haitian Government through diplomatic channels, *El Nacional* says.

The paper adds that Haitian Ambassador General Gerard Constant, retired, was summoned to the Dominican Foreign Ministry, where he was told that the Dominican Government had nothing to do with the anti-Haitian campaign said to be developing in the country. He was also told that the Balaguer government would do everything in its power to prevent such a campaign. [end recording]

Rumors of Church Support for Gourgue Denied

FL192222 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Excerpt] At a news conference this morning, Rev Sylvio Claude's Haitian Christian Democratic Party [PDCH] reported there is a rumor circulating to the effect that the Catholic Church is supporting the presidential candidacy of Gerard Gourgue. The PDCH believes this is false. It says it is a maneuver to influence the electorate, and that the Catholic Church will remain neutral during the elections.

The Episcopal Conference has stated that the Catholic Church will support no candidate in the coming elections but will instead support the Haitian people throughout the electoral process. [passage omitted]

Candidate Allegedly Trying To Buy Votes

FL192237 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1200 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Report by Cayes correspondent]

[Excerpt] There was a fracas yesterday evening in front of the headquarters of the National Labor Party [PNT] on Rue Stenio Vincent in Les Cayes. Witnesses said the fuss was over $5,000 which PNT leader Thomas Desulme had allegedly given his representatives in Les Cayes so they could pay people to vote for him in the coming elections. [passage omitted]

Conacom To Hold General Assembly on 22 Nov

FL192233 Port-au-Prince Radio Haiti-Inter in Creole 1100 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] A news release from the National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements [Conacom] says: The Conacom national secretariat informs all delegates that the general assembly called for Thursday, 12 November, has been postponed. The general assembly will instead be held at the originally scheduled place and time on 22 November. Delegates are urged to attend.

For the national secretariat: Victor Benoit and Jean-Claude Bajeux.

Rejected Candidates Resort to Violence

Attempted Arson of Church

FL192141 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1200 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Report by Cap-Haitien correspondent (Gerard Mesidor)]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Candidate Janet Louis [a rejected candidate] reportedly tried to set fire to the Catholic Church in Limbe two nights ago. The police had to intervene to prevent this plan from being carried out. We point out that our correspondent in Limbe has had to lie low, because Mr Janet Louis had said that if his candidacy was rejected, he would hold the Soleil correspondent responsible.

Attacks on Electoral Offices

FL182059 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil in Creole 1900 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Last night the Provisional Electoral Council made public the list of candidates running for deputy and senator in the 29 November elections.

At approximately 0700 today, the candidates who were rejected in Hinche trashed the Departmental Electoral Office and the (?Communal Electoral Office). They are threatening to trash other offices tonight.

St Christopher and Nevis

Nevis Schedules Elections for 14 Dec

FL190148 Bridgetown CANA in English 2355 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Charlestown, Nevis, Nov 18, CANA—St Kitts-Nevis Governor-General Sir Clement Arrindell issued a proclamation on Wednesday, announcing the dissolution of the Nevis Island Assembly, which is responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the St Kitts sister island.

A government release said the proclamation issued in accordance with the advice of the premier of Nevis, Simeon Daniel, following consultations with Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, set elections for December 14 with nomination day fixed for November 27.

Daniel's Nevis Reformation Party (NRP) controlled the previous assembly. His strongest challenge is expected to come from the recently formed Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM).

Peso's Value to U.S. Dollar Drops Second Time
FL192320 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish
2157 GMT 19 Nov 87

[All figures as received]

[Text] Mexico City, 19 Nov (NOTIMEX)—For the 2d consecutive day, the Mexican peso lost ground to the dollar in the free market. U.S. dollars were being purchased at 2,350 pesos and sold at 2,400 pesos.

Since yesterday, the total accumulated drop of the peso to the dollar exceeds 654 purchasing units and 687 sales units in comparison to last Tuesday, which is a total drop of 38.5 and 40.1 percent, respectively.

The controlled rate stood at 1,701.70 pesos for the purchase of 1 dollar and 1,710.20 pesos for the sale of 1 dollar.

Riva Palacios Named Gubernatorial Candidate
FL171744 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish
1706 GMT 17 Nov 87

[Text] Mexico City, 17 Nov (NOTIMEX)—The three sectors of the ruling PRI were called to meet today at 1100 (1700 GMT) to show support to Antonio Riva Palacio Lopez as candidate for the nomination of governor of the central state of Morelos.

Riva Palacio Lopez was born on 26 April 1928 in Cuautla, Morelos and is married to Mrs Macaria Than de Riva Palacio.

De la Madrid Affirms Commitment Against Drugs
FL172147 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish
2309 GMT 16 Nov 87

[Text] Mexico City, 16 Nov (NOTIMEX)—Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado today reiterated his government's commitment to continue the relentless fight against drug trafficking and dependency.

The president spoke at the end of a meeting in which the Mexican Government gave a detailed report on its work with the Committee on Drug Dependency [ADEFAR].

During his speech to officials from the health sector, the Mexican Attorney General's Office, 16 delegations from Mexico City, as well as the legal sector, De la Madrid warned it is not possible to allow or tolerate this contemporary vice to advance in the country. Drug dependency risks the future of our children, our nation's health, and national security, he said.

He recognized the efforts of parents, teachers, neighborhood groups, and professionals in the fight against drug dependency. This is an example of citizens and institutions uniting forces to achieve positive results, he said.

After a briefing on the ADEFAR programs being developed in different public administration sectors and in the community, the president called on Mexicans to follow the example shown today in the ADEFAR report. I am sure, he said, that this same program is being implemented throughout the country.

Ramon Aguirre, Mexico City administrator, said social participation is an efficient instrument to completely prevent and confront the cycle of drug dependency and its consequences. We are preventing criminal hands and minds from influencing the health of our youths and society. We are not willing to allow those who want to become rich from others' destruction to go unpunished, said Ramon Aguirre.

The chief of the Mexico City government added that only with the complete participation of the family and society can we find the necessary support to eliminate drug dependency. We are concerned with the 200,000 drug users that have been identified in Mexico City. We are concerned that they are between 14 and 24 years old and we are concerned that out of 1,408 areas studied, 900 of them have this problem.

The meeting was held in Carranza Hall in the presidential residence, Los Pinos. It was attended by National Defense Secretary General Juan Arevalo Gardoqui, Navy Secretary Admiral Miguel Angel Gomez Ortega, Public Education Secretary Miguel Gonzalez Avelar, Social Security Secretary General Ricardo Garcia Sainz, Federal District Prosecutor Renato Sales Gasques, as well as Highway Safety Secretary General Jose Domingo Ramirez Garrdio Abreu and political delegates from the Federal District.

Nicaragua

Ortega Roundtable on Esquipulas, Dialogue

PA191943 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0301 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Roundtable with President Daniel Ortega Saavedra; Foreign Minister Father Miguel D'Escoto; and reporters Javier Chamorro of *El Nuevo Diario*, Maria Isabel Pasos of ANN, Carlos Guadamuz of La Voz de Nicaragua, Jose Esteban Quesada of the "Events" newscast and of DPA, Cristiana Chamorro of *La Prensa*, Gabriela Selzer of *Barricada*, Ernesto Ramirez of AFP, Manlio Tirado of the Mexican daily *Excelsior* and president of the Association of Foreign Correspondents, Freddy Rostran of "The Awakening" newscast, Alejandro Romero of The People's Radio Broadcasting Corporation, and Sergio De Castro of Sistema Sandinista Television on 18 November—recorded]

[Text] [Moderator] First of all, on behalf of Sistema Sandinista Television, we want to thank President Ortega for accepting this invitation to this discussion of the cease-fire negotiations and the Esquipulas agreements. We also thank Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Father Miguel D'Escoto for his presence here accompanying the comrade president and also to participate with us in this discussion. We also thank the Nicaraguan and foreign journalists who are here. First of all, President Ortega will make an introductory statement, and then we will begin an open conversation during which we will ask whatever questions we want on the topics that have attracted national and international attention. We will now listen to the president:

[Ortega] What are the questions bothering our people? What questions are in the minds of peasants, workers, professionals, technicians, intellectuals, and the opposition groups regarding this cease-fire proposal presented by the Nicaraguan Government? This is a good opportunity to clear any doubts or uncertainties those who are truly interested in achieving peace in Nicaragua and Central America may have.

I have returned from Washington, where I attended an OAS meeting. I went there because the OAS headquarters is located there. Under the shadow of the church—that is, the Vatican, in the apostolic nunciature in Washington—a meeting was held in favor of peace with His Eminence Cardinal Obando y Bravo and House Speaker Jim Wright.

Since we are interested in peace, in finding a peaceful solution to this conflict, and in complying with the Guatemala agreements, when I arrived at the OAS in Washington I tried to contact the U.S. Government and Mr Wright. Why? Because on 4 August President Reagan, accompanied by Wright, presented a bipartisan proposal for peace in Central America. That proposal was not rejected by Nicaragua. However, there was then a meeting in Guatemala where that proposal was not discussed, and the Guatemala agreements were signed instead. Therefore, it was only natural that while in the United States, and taking advantage of my stay in Washington to attend the OAS General Assembly, I should try to meet and talk with political leaders such as President Reagan and Wright who claim to be interested in peace. Mr Wright was willing to talk with us, to support this effort, and to participate in a meeting that took place, I repeat, under the shadow of the Catholic Church, of the Vatican, and the meeting was held in the Vatican's office in Washington. It was there the talks were held, knowing the Vatican's position in favor of peaceful solutions to international conflicts. In view of the Central American situation and [words indistinct] it was only natural we should meet at the apostolic nunciature in Washington. The meeting caused many arguments and criticisms—you have probably followed the reaction in the United States to Wright's participation in those talks as part of the peace efforts. Nicaragua delivered its proposal to Cardinal Obando y Bravo, who in turn had it delivered to the contras. We will now see what the contras have to say about the proposal.

The argument in the United States between the executive and legislative branches seems to have been resolved for the moment by a joint statement from Wright and Secretary of State Shultz. That statement contained very important points, such as expressing support for the cardinal in his efforts, and it supported the peace effort conducted by the Central Americans, stressing that, basically, the Central Americans should participate in this effort. We agree with that. In so doing, the Central Americans have not ruled out the participation of other people and countries who wish to support this peace effort.

In sum, those were our main actions during the past few days. The proposal we presented at the apostolic nunciature...

[Moderator, interrupting] Mr President, when you began speaking you said you wondered what doubts the people and [words indistinct] had. The government and the FSLN have said there will be no talks with the contras. Now [words indistinct] cease-fire negotiations you have mentioned you began talks at the apostolic nunciature in Washington. Is beginning talks for negotiating a cease-fire not in fact a political recognition of the contras? Does this not also recognize and give the contras the status of (?belligerents)? Is this not a dialogue—in essence a political dialogue—with the contras from the moment you begin talks to agree on a cease-fire?

[Ortega] Well, the current situation Nicaragua faces due to U.S. policy is undoubtedly political, to a large extent. For years the United States has been using the contras as an instrument to support its policy of destroying the Nicaraguan revolution. With the signing of the Guatemala agreement we decided to give armed groups the opportunity to participate in the political life of our respective countries. In other words, it was decided to

give people involved in armed activities a chance. However, we did not mention a political dialogue, in the strict sense of the word, because a political dialogue would include other matters having to do with the country's institutions, with the country's democratization process, and with the Constitution itself. Those topics are being discussed in the political dialogue taking place here in Nicaragua with the civilian opposition parties and groups. However, we are trying to begin negotiations for a cease-fire and then proceed with other actions. The first step would be reaching an agreement on a cease-fire, agreeing on a cease-fire at a crucial moment. The second step would be disarmament; those who lay down their weapons would be automatically protected by an amnesty and they would be given the opportunity to participate in the country's political life and in political activities as members of the opposition. So in this case we are not considering a political dialogue but negotiating a cease-fire so they—anyone who wants—can come here, after laying down their weapons, to participate in the political dialogue.

[C. Chamorro] How do you explain the contradiction that on the one hand there will be a negotiated cease-fire—which is the path to peace—and on the other hand the Nicaraguan people's freedom will be sold for $270 million, because you said the newspaper *La Prensa* would be closed if the U.S. Congress approved that $270 million? We do not think the Nicaraguans have any influence on what the U.S. Congress decides about our country and about our basic right to press freedom.

[Ortega] You are specifically referring to the fact that if the U.S. Congress approves the $270 million then *La Prensa* will be closed, and you interpret this as selling Nicaragua's freedom. Well, I have explained in this regard that the U.S. policy of aggression has provoked the closing of the democratic political opening in our country. It has been closed because of U.S. pressure. Precisely on the day after the approval of the $100 million in the United States—which is the country waging war on the Nicaraguans—we decided to close the newspaper *La Prensa*. Even though *La Prensa* was speaking in favor of the contras—which are a U.S. tool and are being financed and armed by the United States—until Congress approved that $100 million *La Prensa* could speak, and there was no problem.

[C. Chamorro] But why don't you do something so that $270 million will not be approved by offering and implementing democratic measures such as, for example, permitting the Constitution to be discussed or by establishing a totally independent electoral tribunal—these kinds of measures?

[Ortega] I think all of those points can be discussed in the national dialogue, where all the opposition parties are present. Each party can express there whatever it wants regarding the Constitution or any other idea. They can propose whatever they want. Reasonable proposals will be accepted.

[Unidentified Reporter] As a result of your meeting with the cardinal in Washington [words indistinct] you proposed that future meetings would have to be held in the United States. However, some people, such as Costa Rican President Arias, have proposed they be held in Managua. This creates a difference of opinion that might lead to a stalemate in these talks over such a minor point as the site. Meanwhile, the cardinal is also demanding greater influence in these talks and does not want to be just an intermediary. What is your opinion?

[Ortega] The intermediary is not a messenger. We believe, as I explained to Cardinal Obando y Bravo, that the intermediary has an active role in which in a period...

[Reporter] [passage indistinct]

[Ortega]Yes.

[Moderator] Quesada of the "Events" program.

[Quesada] Has Cardinal Obando been appointed mediator in writing? He was demanding this be done. He was also demanding that his functions be defined. It seems this is where the difficulty lies.

[Ortega] I clarified this to him at the nunciature in Washington. I explained to him that the intermediary—given the qualifications of someone like Cardinal Obando y Bravo—will contribute to the process. Therefore, in his role as intermediary he can make suggestions, express his opinion, and give advice on achieving the cease-fire, and, therefore, to have those who are now involved in the armed counterrevolutionary activities participate in the country's civic life as a political force, if they so wish.

Regarding the site of the talks, we believe the ideal thing would be to hold them in Washington. Why in Washington? Because that is the headquarters of the U.S. Government, which directs all this policy, attacks Nicaragua, and finances the contras. The contras themselves have said that if more funds are not approved the movement will die and they will disappear. Therefore, it is logical that if we want the talks to be successful then the site should be in Washington because this would further involve the U.S. Congress and even the U.S. Executive Branch in the peace efforts. In other words, the issue of the site is not based on a whim. Instead, it is a realistic element. In other words, to the extent that the meetings are held in Washington there are greater possibilities for progress in the talks.

[Pasos] Maria Isabel Pasos of ANN. On several occasions you have referred to the possibility that the members of the counterrevolutionary leadership can join the country's political life and even participate in the national dialogue. Do you really think the Nicaraguan people are prepared to accept this possibility?

[Ortega] I think the Nicaraguan people first of all want peace, but of course not peace at the cost of sacrificing the revolutionary achievements. The Nicaraguan people want real peace and not the peace of slaves. We could reach a peace agreement, conceding to the United States that Nicaragua will again be a slave of the United States. However, the Nicaraguan people do not want that peace of slaves.

[Pasos] [Words indistinct] then is the concerted cease-fire interpreted as a concession by the Sandinist government or as an achievement by Sandinist diplomacy?

[Ortega] This involves taking a specific step so peace will be achieved in our country, combining the actions for the military defense of the revolution with the opportunities given to the people we are confronting with weapons so they will stop harming the people, stop being used as a tool of another country's policy, and so they can participate in the country's civic life. I think the Nicaraguan people understand this because it is preferable to wage a political battle in the framework of political pluralism, which the Nicaraguan revolution defends. The Nicaraguan revolution is waging a military battle which entails the loss of thousands of Nicaraguan lives and damage to the economy and private and public property.

[Selzer] Gabriela Selzer from *Barricada*. You said the cease-fire proposed to the counterrevolutionaries is a proposal, not an ultimatum. Could you explain why it is not an ultimatum? What reactions does the government expect from the counterrevolution in this cease-fire process?

[Ortega] This is a proposal, not an ultimatum. An ultimatum would be equivalent to telling the contras: Take it or leave it; that is to say, you either accept the Nicaraguan Government proposal in its entirety or you turn it down. If they turn this proposal down we would have formally complied with Esquipulas. Nicaragua is entitled to do this, and it is stipulated in the Esquipulas accords. By telling this to the contras we would be acting according to the Constitution. They either accept this proposal or they turn it down. If they reject it, Nicaragua can tell the world: Nicaragua has complied, the contras have not, and let the war continue. But because we want the war and bloodshed to cease we must make a realistic proposal so the contras can express their views on it. That is, we must make a realistic proposal so the United States may express its views on it, because the United States will be expressing its views through the contras. I would say that what has been established these days, at the nunciature in Washington, is a communications link with the United States, through mediators; that is, through the contras. Thus, we are discussing the cease-fire with the United States.

[Reporter] Could this be interpreted as if Nicaragua is seeking two ways to hold a dialogue? Is the first one with a mediator, through the contras who would in turn talk to the United States? Is the second a dialogue with the Reagan administration, at the governmental level?

[Ortega] Well, here we are responding to two positions. One, the U.S. Government has said there are some security matters that have not been taken into account in the Guatemala agreements. We have always been willing to discuss security concerns with the United States. We have always been willing to discuss all these problems regarding peace with the United States because the United States is helping the contras. However, because the U.S. has maintained a closed position of not holding a dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government the Guatemala agreements were created, that is, the Esquipulas II agreements. In the Esquipulas II agreements all the Central American governments made a commitment to establish, or to take steps to promote a dialogue. Specifically, the document reads: For this purpose, the corresponding governments will begin the dialogue with all disarmed, internal political opposition groups, and with those that have agreed to the amnesty, which is what we are already doing here—that is, a political dialogue. However, we are also obligated to take steps to attain a negotiated cease-fire. The governments of the [Central American] states made a commitment to expend all the efforts necessary to attain an effective cease-fire within the constitutional framework. Therefore, by taking this step we are fulfilling the Guatemala agreements.

However, we are actually starting an indirect dialogue with the United States, provided the contras do not reject our proposal. If the contras say: We reject the Nicaraguan proposal, we are not willing to discuss any of these matters with the Nicaraguan Government unless the Nicaraguan Government decides to move up the elections, unless the Nicaraguan Government resigns; or if the contras begin to set political conditions—if the contras adopt such a position they would obviously be rejecting this kind of solution provided for the armed groups under the Guatemala agreements so these groups may participate in the country's political life. This is why I have said that here—that communication is being established with the U.S. Government through the mediation of the contras because the U.S. Government will be the one who will tell the contras how they should act. The U.S. Government is the one who created the contras in Washington, precisely on the day a meeting was held at the nunciature. Up to that time the contras had been wandering in Washington, making statements, holding meetings; moreover, they even appeared at an OAS meeting. There, the U.S. Government tried to have the contra delegation seated at the place assigned to a Latin American or Caribbean delegation, which was rejected by all delegates. The contra delegation was not allowed to occupy a place at that meeting.

[Ramirez] Ramirez, AFP. Some opposition sectors believe the way in which the cease-fire proposal was presented to the contras has been designed to appear as a sort of call to surrender. What are your views on that?

[Ortega] Well, the truth is that this is not a call to surrender at all. Rather, it is a proposal made so that they may give up their weapons, give up their weapons,

[repeats himself] accept amnesty, and join the political life in the country, with all the necessary guarantees.

[Tirado] Max Tirado of Mexico *Excelsior*. Judging from recent statements by members of the counterrevolution it seems that they are going to propose that the talks be held in Managua, that all former Somozist guards be released, and that general elections be called. If this is presented as a counterproposal, what would the government's position be?

[Ortega] I cannot answer a counterproposal that has not been made, that we do not know of. There are many pressures for a counterproposal. Let us wait to see what the contras think about the Nicaraguan Government's proposal. Let us see what they think about that. As for a site, I even explained to Cardinal Obando y Bravo that it was not advisable to meet here in Nicaragua because this would lead to great political tension in the country. The rightist groups would mobilize to receive the contras. Since there is political pluralism in this country, and this means that all those who want to voice their political feelings can mobilize either to cheer or repudiate the contras, then the FSLN, as a political party, would also join the mobilization. Then, we would probably have here 500,000 people—at least—repudiating the arrival of the contras, and only a few people supporting the contras' arrival. This, we would say, would not create an atmosphere favorable for negotiations. The place where the talks would be held would immediately be surrounded by thousands of people.

We know what the political situation is like in the country. So, if we want this to come out right, if we want the bloodshed to stop and peace to come to Nicaragua, it would not be advisable for us to discuss a cease-fire when we know it would be of no help. If it helped, I would be the first to agree and to be pleased. We know it would cause great tension.

[J. Chamorro] Mr President, Javier Chamorro, from *El Nuevo Diario*. Reflecting some concerns, particularly from the rightist parties, there have been comments that your trip to Washington was like those made in the past by the conservatives, who went to Washington to discuss matters concerning Nicaragua. What do you think of this view of the rightist parties?

[Ortega] Well, there is no comparison. First, when the conservatives went to Washington on these trips they were received—very well received—by U.S. Government leaders. In my case, well, I was not well received by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government avoided meeting with me and no formal meeting took place in the United States. One meeting took place there, on the Catholic Church's territory, that is, on Vatican territory, because the apostolic nunciature is Vatican territory just like any embassy is territory of the country it represents. Therefore, there is no comparison. One must bear in mind that I went to the OAS headquarters, which is located in Washington. All Latin American and Caribbean countries are represented at and participate in the OAS. The OAS has clearly shown support for the peace efforts by the Contadora and Support Groups, and it is now backing the Guatemala agreements.

[C. Chamorro] Mr President, the domestic civic opposition in Nicaragua feels the cease-fire plan is a result of and not the cause of this crisis and that the cause of this crisis is the absence of democracy in Nicaragua. Would you be willing to risk losing power by having free elections before 1989, when your presidential term ends?

[Ortega] Well, I would be prepared to hold elections here tomorrow. However, what would happen if we held elections tomorrow? What would happen is that instead of getting 87 percent of the vote as in the 1984 elections the FSLN would get 89 or 90 percent of the vote. So, it is best to give the opposition a little time to organize and garner some votes so we may have some opposition, so the elections will have some spice. Otherwise, the FSLN would win in a landslide. Even [New York Mayor] Koch very intelligently made this recommendation when he returned to the United States. He said it was absurd to ask that the elections be held ahead of time because the Sandinists would sweep them, that it would be best to bide for time, and that the United States should invest money because, of course, the United States would give money to the opposition parties here to get a following and be able to really put up a fight against the FSLN.

[Reporter] You said this is a proposal to arrange a cease-fire and not an ultimatum, that it is a proposal, and that the government is prepared to listen to a counterproposal from the counterrevolutionaries. What points would the government be ready to negotiate with the counterrevolutionaries? What points in the proposal are negotiable? What points would the government not agree to negotiate with the counterrevolutionaries to arrive at a cease-fire?

[Ortega] In the first place, it must be clear that this negotiation for a cease-fire is not with the counterrevolutionaries. It is with the United States. The fact that the counterrevolutionaries are going to be a front is something else. However, the United States is the one that is really negotiating here and the United States will be the one that will put up a front (?for) the contras with a proposal that we may find out about in the next few days.

Therefore, we will simply adhere to what the Guatemala agreement says. Indeed, in an explanation to a British newspaper a few days ago President Arias emphatically said that a political type dialogue is not under consideration. In other words, proposals of a political type are not being contemplated. What is being considered is the arrangement of a cease-fire.

Well, we have some given areas but they do not think those zones are right. (?Exceptions can be made) in regard to these aspects, (?technical aspects). Well, they want to know how their security will be guaranteed when they turn in their weapons; if nothing will happen to them; and if they can rejoin the country's political life. Well, we are going to discuss this.

[Reporter] Now they are proposing to stay where they are.

[Ortega] I am not familiar with their proposal. Now, then, if they propose to stay where they are they would place Honduras in a tremendous bind because they are in Honduras, and what they do in Nicaragua is to run from one place to another. They are in Honduras; they are in Washington. That's where they are. So, we think that their proposal places Honduras in a bind. Honduras has voiced concern in this regard and wants a [new] location to be found for the contras within the overall implementation of the Guatemala agreement.

[Rostran] Freddy Rostran from "The Awakening." Alfredo Cesar reported yesterday from Spanish radio stations and (?newspapers) from San Jose, Costa Rica, that the contras may agree on a cease-fire, but without surrendering their weapons. For that they would wait until a later date while democratization is implemented in Nicaragua. What do you say to this?

[Ortega] That is Alfredo Cesar's opinion. I believe we must wait for the proposal the U.S. Government will make through the contras. [passage indistinct] I cannot respond to individual opinions because to do so would be contradictory. Those people are paid by the CIA and are known as the contra hierarchy. One of them will say one thing and another will say something else; they contradict each other, and because of this we cannot hold a dialogue. We must wait for the U.S. proposal, which the State Department must already be preparing. It will be given to the contras, and the contras will relay it to the Nicaraguan Government. After this they will respect the fulfillment of the Guatemala agreements.

[Reporter] Commander, would your government agree to have these discussions, the dialogue between the government representatives and the contras with the mediation [words indistinct] by Cardinal Obando y Bravo, in Managua or a Central American country, in a place similar to the place used in Washington? In other words, I mean a nunciature in a Central American country or an embassy, to hasten the proposal made by the government?

[Ortega] I have explained why it would not be convenient in Managua. The nunciature is a good place in any country that might be decided upon, of course. Our proposal is that this be continued where it was started, at the nunciature in Washington. We are talking about the nunciature in Washington, where the whole process was initiated. And in Central America it is not convenient because the Guatemala City agreements commit all Central American governments to not allow political activities or logistical activities on the part of those people who reside in our countries and who are linked overtly or covertly with armed groups that are attacking another Central American government. All of the Central American governments are committed to complying with this stipulation, which is also part of the Guatemala City agreements, and it would be contradictory for us to comply with this part of the agreement and at the same time have these types of conversations in Central American.

[Reporter] Mr President, we all know that for almost 9 years now the position of the U.S. Government has been totally opposed to that of the Nicaraguan Government. If the contras are really the visible face of the United States in all of this and a counterproposal is expected from the contras, surely this counterproposal is not going to be acceptable to your government. If that happens, what could we expect from all of this that is going on?

[Ortega] It is not convenient to advance opinions because we still do not know about that counterproposal. And I would like to believe in the statements made by Secretary Shultz, who is President Reagan's representative, and Speaker Wright. I would like to believe in what Speaker Wright says, and I would like to believe in what Secretary Shultz says in those statements. And if that is true, then that means the counterproposal about the reservations or observations that the contras might make to the proposal of the Nicaraguan Government will be the observations made by the U.S. Government, but they will be made within a reasonable framework. In other words, they would not be directed toward destroying any possibility of holding talks.

[Reporter] Commander, does Jim Wright's attendance at the meeting you and Cardinal Obando had in Washington entail a probable involvement of the Democratic Party in these peace efforts?

[Ortega] Well, it is well known that sectors of the Democratic Party have opposed U.S. policy against Nicaragua all along. Mr Wright was called by the President of the United States on 4 August to involve himself in a peace proposal; he himself recalled that in yesterday's six points. Therefore, Mr Wright is a qualified person to contribute to this peace effort in Central America, and that is why we have invited him to participate in this effort.

[Reporter] The Esquipulas process continues to march ahead, Comrade President, and supposing that all of the Central American governments fulfill all their commitments and everything would march along well—however, the issue of the $270 million would be pending; it has been delayed, but it is still there. It has been announced that this issue will be discussed in January. It will be

approved or rejected, but we cannot know whether in the end the Democrats will reach an agreement with the Republicans and approve the $270 million.

This would mean that from the start Esquipulas is dead, because it is no use for the Central American governments to reach agreements when wars continue to be financed with the approval of this quantity of money.

[Ortega] We believe that if Esquipulas is complied with the United States will simply have no other option in Central America but to use its troops directly against Nicaragua. Because compliance with Esquipulas means there will no longer be camps in Honduras, no supply bases in Honduras, the contra leadership will no longer be able to move about in Costa Rica or any other American countries and engage in political activism against Nicaragua. Therefore, if Esquipulas is complied with the United States would have no other option.

[Reporter] What is the current role of Mr Wright's commission? There is interest in whether Mr Wright called you or you called Mr Wright when you visited Washington.

[Ortega] First, we have maintained communications with many U.S. congressmen visiting our country to learn about Nicaragua's situation. Some of them favor the contra war and others oppose it. In other words, we meet with everybody. We even met with Mr Dole, who is now a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. He had a very clear position. Although he held a very clear position against Nicaragua, I also met with him. Knowing Mr Wright's position I invited him to contribute to this peace effort in view of his willingness to support peace in Central America.

Going back to *La Prensa*'s concern over the $270 million, I wish to ask *La Prensa*: Does *La Prensa* agree with the approval of funds in the United States to wage a war against Nicaragua?

[C. Chamorro] *La Prensa* wants a democratization of Nicaragua. That would prevent the U.S. Congress from approving the aid to the contras...

[Ortega, interrupting] But does it approve of it?

[C. Chamorro] It does not like that aid and it has always maintained that position in its editorials that were censored for 4 years. We said that the $100 million in aid meant more bloodshed, horror, and fear for the Nicaraguan people. For that reason it urged negotiation, peace, and reconciliation. That has always been *La Prensa's* line, but it was not allowed to freely express its views; it was censored.

[Ortega] In other words, *La Prensa* opposes the $270 million?

[C. Chamorro] *La Prensa* believes (?if there is democratization) in Nicaragua, it would oppose...

[Ortega, interrupting] No, no, and...

[C. Chamorro] We could say it opposes [words indistinct] *La Prensa* does not want war.

[Ortega] Because this is a problem among Nicaraguans; it is a problem that we Nicaraguans must resolve and the United States has no reason to (?support) the war...

[C. Chamorro, interrupting] *La Prensa* has advocated a solution here in Nicaragua.

[Ortega] If *La Prensa* opposes the $270 million and favors... [changes thought] What does *La Prensa* believe: [Words indistinct] compliances with the Esquipulas agreements?

[C. Chamorro] *La Prensa* supports the Esquipulas agreements...

[Ortega, interrupting] *La Prensa* need not worry; if *La Prensa* supports the Esquipulas agreements and opposes the $270 million, and if the $270 million is approved tomorrow, it need not worry.

[C. Chamorro] The problem is that *La Prensa* cannot issue an opinion on whether that $270 million will be approved or not because it is not *La Prensa*'s responsibility to [words indistinct] that $270 million is approved by the Congress. That is strictly an issue pertaining to domestic U.S. needs and the [words indistinct] of its government.

[Ortega] I remember that when Dr Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was *La Prensa* director he expressed opposition to U.S. Government policy in editorials when he wished to do so. I do not see why *La Prensa* today cannot express opposition to a policy that means more bloodshed for the Nicaraguan people; I do not see why *La Prensa* cannot express support for the Esquipulas peace agreement.

If *La Prensa* follows that line, that is, if it feels patriotically inclined to express opposition to the $270 million, it should say to the United States: Look, President Reagan, you should not approve funds because they bring more destruction and death and will not (?strengthen) democracy in Nicaragua.

[C. Chamorro] In expressing support for the Esquipulas agreement it has already expressed opposition to the $270 million.

[Ortega] *La Prensa* has no reason to worry, then. If that is *La Prensa*'s position rest assured that *La Prensa* will not be affected even if the $270 million is approved tomorrow.

[C. Chamorro] OK, we...

[Ortega, interrupting] You can rest assured about that.

[C. Chamorro] We worry about approval because we understand that approval would imply that Nicaragua is not being democratized.

[Ortega] So you are designating the U.S. Government to be judge in this issue; that is, the United States will determine whether there is democracy in Nicaragua.

[C. Chamorro] I believe that you assumed the role of judge first because you said that our closure depends on whether the $270 million is approved.

[Ortega] That was based on *La Prensa's* attitude. However, if *La Prensa's* attitude is the one you are expressing—that it unconditionally opposes the $270 million, because the United States is not to decide how to develop democracy in Nicaragua; that it supports the Guatemala agreements [words indistinct]; that it supports Cardinal Obando y Bravo's efforts to achieve a cease-fire; that there should be a pluralism instead of an armed opposition—then *La Prensa* need not worry if the $270 million is approved tomorrow.

If *La Prensa* advocates a different position or maintains other kinds of relationships it should worry. Who is worried about a possible [words indistinct]? Those who are linked to the CIA, receiving CIA funds, that [words indistinct] from the CIA. Those are the ones who should worry. However, if *La Prensa* is not maintaining those kind of links it need not worry.

[C. Chamorro] Mr President, *La Prensa* is concerned about this because we believe the Nicaraguan Government is not really complying with all of the Esquipulas agreements and because it is not fulfilling its commitment to lead Nicaragua to democratization. That is why it is concerned, because if you fail to bring democratization they will approve this $270 million and we are going to be closed down.

[Ortega] No, I already said if *La Prensa* opposes the $270 million, if *La Prensa* is not linked to the CIA and is receiving no CIA funds, it need not worry. That is, those who are sin-free need not worry.

[C. Chamorro] We are clear that we are working for Nicaragua's democratization.

[Ortega] That is right.

[Reporter] If you have already clarified the position regarding *La Prensa*, why don't you open other media? [Words indistinct] there is an opening for right-wing sectors. This has been reported by various political sectors, especially leftist ones. With the opening of *La Prensa* there is a space in which the conservative, Social Christian and other sectors can participate. Meanwhile, the participation of other people in the communications media is restricted. There is a restriction. This has led to demands for an opening of some media, for example, Radio Corporacion. Therefore, steps have only been taken for the right wing, for *La Prensa*, and other people are demanding the opening of other communications media to expand the space here. There are no possibilities. There are just a few programs. I think we should think about a way to make this more flexible because you made proposals in Washington and Mexico and after 7 days you come to discuss them with us here. This means that the people must have greater information. The government has the responsibility to inform the people.

[Ortega] I understand that all those who want to air a program and fulfill all the formalities [words indistinct] can request the approval of such a program at the Media Directorate, which is in charge of this. I clarified to Cardinal Obando y Bravo that once Radio Catolica fulfills the legal formalities its news program could be aired. The same holds true for the other news programs [words indistinct] have to fulfill the formalities and be studied and approved by the Media Directorate.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] your trip to Moscow [words indistinct] a communique was issued by the Interior Ministry that said that it would issue a statement on this in the next few days. Three weeks have passed and there has been no decision. Is there some stumbling block, and if there is, the [words indistinct]?

[Ortega] No, there is a willingness to have new programs. The only thing is that the legal formalities must be fulfilled [words indistinct]. In all countries, even in the United States, the communications media must be registered.

[Reporter] Would you be willing to permit a new television channel as requested by the COSEP [Higher Council of Private Enterprise]?

[Ortega] What we are willing to do is to have the state television grant space just as it is given to the opposition groups which can express themselves through the television. This is a practice in many European countries such as Britain, Spain, France, Germany, and Switzerland where television is state-owned.

[Reporter] There are many aspects dealing with the fulfillment of the Esquipulas agreement. In Washington you referred to the Honduran proposal on the possibility of beginning direct negotiations with Nicaragua to reach some agreements that will permit the resolution of the conflicts arising between the two countries as a result of the presence of the counterrevolutionaries in Honduras. What possibilities are there for the start of such a bilateral dialogue with Honduras in the short term? You spoke of [words indistinct].

[Ortega] The Honduran proposal [words indistinct] begin that dialogue with Honduras [words indistinct] foreign minister in the OAS. What we need to do now is to give continuity to this first contact so as to proceed to firmly discuss the Honduran proposal.

[Reporter] Will Nicaragua take that step or will it wait?

[Ortega] No, Nicaragua will of course take the step. Honduras already took the step by making the proposal, and now Nicaragua will establish communications with the Honduran Government to find the way to [words indistinct].

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] ambassador in Honduras?

[Ortega] Our ambassador in Honduras already has precise instructions so that this can be implemented immediately.

[Reporter] Does Nicaragua have specific proposals?

[Ortega] Well, after learning of Honduras' proposal Nicaragua is willing to discuss with Honduras the way to put the Honduran proposal into effect.

[Moderator] Javier Chamorro.

[J. Chamorro] Last night Costa Rican Foreign Minister Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto offered Costa Rican territory for reaching agreement on the cease-fire. This has me confused because Costa Rica was the father of the Esquipulas agreements and it knows that it is a violation of the agreements to use one's territory for such activities [words indistinct].

[Ortega] I have noticed Costa Rica's inclination to lend its territory for these kinds of talks, but there is a problem here that I have expressed to President Arias' representatives. This problem involves the presence in Costa Rica of counterrevolution leaders who are not only residing there, but engaging in political activism against Nicaragua; they are involved in other kinds of activities, propaganda activities and so on, against the Nicaraguan Government. These are not civic opposition groups, but groups linked to the armed counterrevolutionary activity promoted by the United States.

[Reporter] President Ortega, Nicaraguans are concerned about political problems, but they are also concerned about economic problems. At present, it is increasingly more difficult even to put food on our tables day after day because the price of food is reaching inaccessible levels. One pound of beans, the most basic food of Nicaraguans, currently costs between 7,000 and 8,000 cordobas.

Wage increases have had few favorable effects for workers because wage hikes immediately generate an enormous number of price increases in basic products. State enterprises themselves are admitting that they are operating at a loss and requesting loans. This is quite different than the situation in private enterprises. There has always been agreement that the war is our economy's main problem. However, most people agree that war is not the only cause of the economic crisis, but also inefficiency and a policy different from our own. What will the Nicaraguan Government do to resolve this? Will there be an economic dialogue? What will the government do?

[Ortega] We are facing an economic problem that is not exclusive to Nicaragua. The United States itself is shaken by an economic crisis with worldwide reach. The greatest burden is on developing countries. The main point of a meeting involving eight Latin American presidents in Mexico is the Central American issue, but emphasis will be placed on economic issues such as the debt issue and trade exchange, because the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean have been seriously affected by an increasingly more aggressive attitude by highly industrialized countries with market economies, which are subjecting us to an incredible [words indistinct].

[Words indistinct] in many countries in an attempt to stabilize financial fiscal deficits and trade balances have included the closure of hundreds of companies. If we investigate how many companies have been closed this year in Latin America we would find out that hundreds of companies have been closed without allowing Latin American (?leaders) to offer an alternative to their workers. A fiscal stabilization can be achieved through closing companies and unemployment.

However, in Nicaragua we will not follow those formulas, which are IMF formulas that are being imposed on many Latin American and Caribbean countries. In facing our crisis, which is more intensive in Nicaragua because of the war, we are firmly determined to continue seeking ways to maintain at least a minimum level of supplies to the people.

It is true we are facing a situation in which the price-wage relationship is not balanced. At many meetings with workers I have explained that wages are not the solution to Nicaragua's problem. We could increase wages by 4 or 10 times and still not resolve our problems. The economic problem has deep roots. It not only involves our production limits, because even if Nicaragua could produce more coffee, as was the case last year, the additional efforts made by the Nicaraguan people would not be compensated if prices fall, because of the injustice of international [words indistinct].

Those are the great problems. The shortcomings that exist—and there are in fact shortcomings—are because there are no perfect regimes. I realize that there are shortcomings in this administration, but they are not major factors; they are really secondary elements that we

are fighting. However, even if we could completely overcome our shortcomings great problems would still burden the Nicaraguan economy.

We are not talking about political or economic problems or a problem of political economics, but a problem linked to great interests. This mainly involves the United States, which is maintaining a deficit at the expense of developing nations. Our countries do not have an opportunity to develop. This is a very profound problem that is even forcing Latin American countries to reach agreements and hold meetings such as the one involving eight Latin American presidents [words indistinct] because there is concern about this. In other words, there can be no democracy and all those democratic openings in Latin America if we continue to face this threat, if the debt and trade exchange problems are not resolved.

As a result, in the short run we will face social unrest, political pressure, and revolutions; the democratic openings currently taking place in Latin America will end.

I and all the Latin American presidents who are going to meet in Mexico wished that this formula existed, and if there is anyone here in Nicaragua who has this formula, well, do not even bother offering it to the Nicaraguan Government. Go ahead and offer it to any of those governments—the Brazilian, Mexican, or Argentine Governments. They would pay very well for the formula. However, the truth is that the formula does not exist.

[Reporter] I was concerned about... [changes thought] We came here to discuss the 11 points and all the Esquipulas matters; however, we have not truly heard what the people we deal with every day think about this. These people include the workers, the young men in the mountains, etc. We have tried to discuss this and we have found that there is a large sector—at least the people we walked with—who feel we have regressed. They feel the government has yielded too much regarding all these matters. They feel the government was feeling cornered and, in order to step forward, it had to agree with Esquipulas and all the other things. We feel as if our arm is being twisted. So, I would like you to explain this. We want to know if this is so or not.

[Ortega] We have always maintained that peace is necessary. It is a common denominator on the part of those who support the revolution, as well as those who oppose it, such as you. We are all in favor of peace.

However, we have the United States, which is attacking Nicaragua. That occurs outside our will for peace. It is the United States that has (?implemented) its policy of war against Nicaragua. It was not a reaction to a lack of democracy in Nicaragua but a matter that was already included in President Reagan's platform. When he went into the elections he already had used putting an end to the Nicaraguan revolution as a [words indistinct].

There have been 7 years of war. We have made maximum efforts in all areas to achieve peace. It is true that the main effort has been, is, and will be made in the military sphere. If we had felt weak in that area then the Guatemala agreements would not have been signed.

Therefore, I would say that the warmongering positions are becoming increasingly isolated, thanks to the Nicaraguan people's firmness and fighting spirit. Reagan's warmongering stand, which had great international support, support gained by means of pressures and so forth, met with resistance from the Contadora and Support Groups. That is true. That international and internal support led to the approval of the $100 million. Reagan's stand, however, has become increasingly isolated thanks to the strength of the Nicaraguan revolution, to the strength of the Nicaraguan revolution, [repeats himself] which signed Esquipulas. Esquipulas helped isolate Reagan's policy. Because the Nicaraguan revolution is strong we proposed a cease-fire to achieve peace, and this isolates Reagan's policy. [Passage indistinct] We can understand that these steps Nicaragua is taking are victories for the Nicaraguan people and are based mainly on their military capacity to resist. It is not only a capacity that our Army—which is a small group—has, but a capacity that all our people have—all those young men who are in the Patriotic Military Service, who have already been in the service, the thousands of peasants in their cooperatives and their properties organized into self-defense groups and are facing the contras, fighting the contras, and shedding their blood resisting the contra attacks.

This is a basic factor that switched international support in favor of Nicaragua. This is a factor that has caused the isolation of Reagan's policy at home and abroad.

[Reporter] Although Reagan's policy is becoming isolated, internationally speaking, the Reagan administration has hardened its position against Nicaragua. How do you view the solution? Is there any hope for a solution or is it just an illusion?

[Ortega] Well, the Reagan administration, as such, is maintaining a fixed position. It wants to continue supporting the contras and trying to change the Sandinist regime, as they call it. However, the truth is that, within the United States, this administration that is going to request $270 million [words indistinct] has been unable to do so. It has been unable to do so, not because it does not want to, but because conditions inside the United States do not allow it to do so. This $270 million would not be approved under those circumstances.

[Moderator] There are two people who want to speak, Gabriela and also Guadamuz. However, there is a topic that has not been discussed: The political dialogue [words indistinct]. I think that Gabriela is going to ask about that.

[Selzer] No, I wanted to ask about something else. I want to ask about simultaneity. Much has been said about simultaneity in the fulfillment of the agreements. However, for example, in the case of Honduras the Honduran Government has formed the National Reconciliation Commission but it has not called for an end to support for irregular forces operating in its territory, as called for by the peace plan. In fact, it is preparing for new military maneuvers with the United States. What can you tell us about this?

[Ortega] We see contradictory elements in the Honduran Government. On the one hand what you said is happening, and, on the other, a proposal is being made in the opposite direction—the proposal made by Honduras at the OAS on 12 November. We must take Honduras' proposal positively. Simultaneity forces us to do things if the other Central American countries are also doing the same thing. The call for the suspension of actions by irregular groups is something that Honduras will have to comply with. If it has not done so, it will have to do so because Honduras signed the Guatemala agreement. However, simultaneity is something that cannot be seen as something to be done for the moment.

In other words, at any time we must agree to fulfill the agreements. This must be done within an overall framework in which, even prior to 5 November, Nicaraguans who are interested in these agreements took certain steps. We were not obliged to do so but we did because this is a [words indistinct] assurances that Nicaragua will continue to comply with the agreements. This is a political and moral obligation to fulfill these agreements despite other governments that may have doubts about fulfilling the agreements. Well, when they see that Nicaragua is fulfilling the agreements, they are committed to comply with them.

[Selzer] I understood it was a mechanical thing, that all the countries had to fulfill the agreements at the same time. However, in the case of the [Honduran military] maneuvers they are violating the agreements.

[Ortega] Yes, those maneuvers violate the agreements. However, the fact that the maneuvers were announced forces us to tell Honduras that the maneuvers violate the agreements. What we have to emphasize to Honduras now is the proposal they have made. There are two Honduran positions: one against the people, against the agreements, which is the military maneuvers announced for December; and the constructive proposal made at the OAS on 12 November. Therefore, we are forced to accept the 12 November proposal because if it becomes effective the maneuvers will not take place in Honduras; they should not take place in Honduras.

[Reporter] Mr President, we have already seen the Esquipulas deadline getting closer; it is about to expire. Every week we get closer to the time when a series of deadlines will expire, and, well, Nicaragua has been complying. If the other governments do not comply, if there is no consensus in fulfilling these commitments, what will occur if Esquipulas fails?

[Ortega] Well, we have to work hard to prevent the failure of Esquipulas. The Central American presidents will hold a meeting on 15 January. We have already agreed to make an evaluation during the 15 January meeting, to know about the evaluations by the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission, because there were some provisions established in Esquipulas II which have not yet been implemented. We will need to give fresh impetus to encouraging the fulfillment of the agreement. That is to say, the Esquipulas peace plan does not have time limit or a deadline. Rather, it is a process that obligates all the countries to start taking steps beginning on 5 November; however, it does not have a deadline or a time limit.

[Reporter] The opposition participating in the political dialogue—which includes 3 left-wing parties, 12 right-wing parties, and the government represented by Commander Carlos Nunez—is discussing a proposal for the agenda. Yesterday, the government presented a proposal on reforms to the election law, political parties, and the law on municipalities. The opposition is demanding reforms to the Constitution. What is your position on this demand in the opposition proposal, which they will probably present in detail tomorrow?

[Ortega] They [words indistinct].

[Reporter] Only as a complement to that? Is there... [changes thought] For example, one of the arguments used by other parties is: Well, if so many concessions have been made, then why not reform the Constitution once and for all? This is more or less what they have said.

[Ortega] Well, they may present anything they want concerning the reforms to the Constitution or any other point they wish to discuss; they can do it, it would be perfectly right. They may do so because they have the right to do so. This is the reason for having this dialogue, to listen to them. Then it would fall to the National Assembly, in any case, to determine if any of the proposals or suggestions concerning the Constitution made by these parties deserve to be taken into account, if the proposals should be incorporated into the constitutional amendment process. As we all know, the Constitution is going through such an amendment process. Therefore, they now have the opportunity to present their appeals. Obviously, the appeals that are not reasonable will not be taken into consideration.

[Reporter] If the Nicaraguan political parties say to you: Well, we would accept your starting a political dialogue with the contra leadership—would you agree to a political dialogue with the contras?

[Ortega] Well, they...

[Reporter, interrrupting] Precisely, to save Esquipulas.

[Ortega] Well, they may do it. The cease-fire proposal seeks to get the contras to participate in the political dialogue. That is, the cease-fire does not seek to have the contras remain there, armed forever, in (Honduras) or elsewhere without fighting, nor does it seeks to have the contras remain inside the zones we have established. Rather, the cease-fire is the initial step to finally have the contras take part in the political dialogue. Thus, the way they can participate in the political dialogue is by agreeing to the cease-fire, by giving up their weapons. Then we will have the contras participating as another political party. We would then have 16 political opposition groups in the national dialogue. Otherwise, we would have 15 opposition political groups and the contras would continue depending on the position adopted by each member of the 15 political groups. Some of them have been members of the Conservative Party, others have been members of the parties that are [words indistinct]. That is, many of the people taking part in the armed counterrevolutionary activities have been members of the parties participating in the national dialogue. Therefore, they may return to [words indistinct] and participate in the national dialogue, provided they follow the procedure established in the Esquipulas peace plan and in our cease-fire proposal.

[Reporter] Mr President, is the proposal made by the U.S. Government, to the effect that on the day the talks on cease-fire begin Shultz would be willing to meet with the Central American foreign ministers, still valid? Wright and Shultz issued a communique yesterday saying they would make joint efforts to find a solution based on the Central American initiative. What are your views on this?

[Ortega] I believe the joint communique issued by Shultz and Wright is at least one U.S. Government proposal in which it does not refuse to find clear solutions or to hold possible bilateral talks. I believe this is very important right now.

[Reporter] We have one last question. [passage indistinct]

President Ortega, press dispatches have reported that during your recent tour you stated that the Nicaraguan process would follow the model of the Mexican revolution. If this is true, I would like to ask you how it would advance by this route, as the Mexican model is generally identified with a party that has more than 50 years of being in power, where social reforms are still pending, and that has an independent foreign policy but a firm internal policy? How do you visualize Nicaragua's advances using this model?

[Ortega] [passage indistinct]

[Reporter] Yes, my question is: Do you think your negotiations in Washington along with the Nicaraguan Government's agreeing to negotiate, through concerted effort, a cease-fire with the contras, have those things [words indistinct] to any extent the possibility of a dialogue between Nicaragua and the United States?

[Ortega] I do believe so. I definitely believe this step has been very important, but I could not say it has already set up a dialogue. The U.S. Government itself has been clear about that. Yesterday's statements by Secretary Shultz and Speaker Wright does leave that possibility open.

Regarding the Mexican revolution, I have been asked what process is most like the Nicaraguan revolution and I have responded that I find many similarities between our process and the Mexican revolution. However, it must be understood that they are revolutions that occurred at different times and with [words indistinct] features between the revolutions. This is [words indistinct] because in Nicaragua, well, some elements of the political organization have been moving at a (?slower) speed than those same organizations moved in the Mexican revolution. The war that occurred in Mexico [words indistinct] for the revolution. Although it is true that Nicaragua is being attacked and that the Nicaraguan people are going through a counterrevolutionary war as those [words indistinct] it is in a different international context, in a different Latin American context. This difference allows elections to take place in the midst of war, it allows political [words indistinct] it allows freedom of expression, organization by the different political forces [words indistinct] in another country. Thus we have similarities in the strong nationalist contents, in strong defense of self-determination, defense of sovereignty, and the need to make deep social reforms.

Here in Nicaragua [words indistinct] promoting irreversible social reforms, such as distributing land to the peasants. I must say here that this is one of the deepest transformations made by the Nicaraguan revolution—the nationalization of natural resources and other measures that are linked to democratization of production. Thus our farmers can also have access to information media; there is democratization of organization so they can also organize themselves. Of course this applies to farmers and other people who were previously downtrodden. They can organize themselves, can state their opinions, can discuss issues, can talk. These are similarities between the answers given by the Sandinist revolution and the proposals of the Mexican revolution.

[Reporter] Mr President, we seem to have touched almost every subject and nothing has been kept in a drawer for [words indistinct]. We have talked about concerted effort and what you think about it [words indistinct]; we have talked about the role of [word indistinct] the head of Congress, and we have basically covered the entire agenda in the case of Esquipulas II [words indistinct] optimistic now as you make your final

statements in this 1 and 1/2 hour conversation. Are you optimistic about how the agreements are being carried out? Do you sleep easier today than before the Esquipulas agreements were signed? Do you believe that you are more aware that peace is coming closer?

[Ortega] I have always been optimistic. I have never stopped being optimistic, and I will continue being optimistic because this revolution has the formidable support of the Nicaraguan people. That is a decisive element. That is what determines whether or not a revolution can be destroyed.

Despite the difficulties in the struggle, despite the economic embargo provoked by the United States, despite the criminal war that the United States has waged and continues to wage against our people, the Nicaraguan people do not take a step back. They are not demoralized. They are people who are struggling for peace with weapons in hand. They are struggling for peace in the international arena through diplomacy and negotiations. They will continue to be a decisive factor in achieving peace because I think that peace will have to arrive in Nicaragua sooner of later.

The decisive factor will continue to be the Nicaraguan people: the workers, the peasants, the rank and file, the technicians, the patriotic professionals, and the patriotic and nationalist producers. They will continue to be the fundamental factor.

This involves the armed defense of the revolution. This means that we cannot lower our guard. We have to always fight the mercenary forces. We have to always be ready to confront a possible intervention by U.S. troops because all these elements are affecting and will continue to affect Nicaragua as long as the normalization of relations with the United States is not achieved. The contras could even accept amnesty tomorrow and become one more political force in the country.

But if the United States does not change its attitude the war will continue under other forms. [Words indistinct] but if the United States maintains its position of seeking to eliminate the Nicaraguan revolution then they will resort to using their own troops. I am not making this up. Nicaraguans are not paranoid about the danger of U.S. intervention. President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have clearly said on many occasions and even recently that it would be preferable to destroy the Sandinist regime through the contras rather than have to later be forced to use their own boys; in other words, to use U.S. troops. They have said that on many occasions. They said it recently, just a few weeks ago. They continue to repeat it. Therefore, this danger, this threat exists.

That is the reason why it is important to redouble efforts at this time in favor of peace, especially in the military area. We have to strengthen the people's mobilization for the defense of the revolution. Any call against the defense of the revolution is a call to betray the fatherland. It is a call to betray Nicaragua because when we issue a call to defend the revolution we are calling for the defense of the new regime that emerged after the revolutionary triumph. We are calling for the defense of political pluralism, freedom of speech, human rights, and everyone's right to organize.

Therefore, those who are against that call to military mobilization, those who sabotage it, those who hinder it, and those who oppose it become accomplices of foreign aggression. This is the war that we are waging against that William Walker, whose name is Ronald Reagan. All Nicaraguans, without political distinctions, are obliged to unite in a single front to struggle and entrench ourselves in [words indistinct] throughout Nicaragua to defeat those aggressors. Military service, the call to military defense, does not make exceptions. It does not say that only members of the Sandinist Front must fight. Instead, it calls on all Nicaraguans who have real patriotic feelings to march to the defense of the fatherland, to march to the defense of Nicaragua. That is the element that we must defend at this time in order to guarantee the consolidation of the Nicaraguan revolution and to guarantee that peace will be a reality in the future.

[Moderator] Thank you, President Daniel Ortega, Father Miguel D'Escoto, the reporters who accepted this invitation to discuss these topics, and the television viewers for having joined us. Good night.

Politicians Comment on FSLN Proposal

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[Text] Dr Fernando Zelaya Rojas, a member of the Conservative Party, has said that the FSLN proposal will serve as a means to listen to the opposition's views. That proposal frames the dialogue within the constitutional order as mandated by the Esquipulas agreements, he said.

Zelaya added that we must bear in mind that peace in Nicaragua demands many sacrifices from both sides. He described as positive a proposal presented within the national dialogue by government representative Dr Rodrigo Reyes.

We are on the right path; the good part of the dialogue is beginning. The dialogue continues; the government's proposal contains a number of laws that must be amended to ensure democratization.

[Begin recording] [Zelaya] Justice Minister Rodrigo Reyes just presented a proposal which includes certain amendments pertaining to democratization in Nicaragua. You are aware of the problems we have faced with the agenda, but they are now in the past.

[Reporter] Do you mean (?changes) in the Constitution?

[Zelaya] No, agenda changes. This has drawn diverse reactions from dialogue participants. I believe it is the same proposal presented by Commander Ortega in Washington—through His Eminence [Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo]—to the counterrevolution. He himself said this is not an ultimatum.

We must remain calm and hope the FSLN will listen to the opposition's suggestions and change its proposal.

[Reporter] What is the gist of that proposal?

[Zelaya] First, the aim is to frame what they call a dialogue within a constitutional order, just as Esquipulas mandates. Of course, Esquipulas does not call for constitutional reform, which is what the parties seek; it does not call for actions outside constitutional order. It calls for reforms within the order specified by the Constitution itself.

There are a number of laws they believe must be amended before there can be democratization. This in itself constitutes acceptance because the government says the Electoral Law should be amended. This means the Electoral Law, which regulated the past elections, is at least not perfectly democratic; there is agreement that it should be amended. The same applies to the Law on Political Parties and a number of other laws that I believe will also be amended.

[Reporter] Is it true the dialogue was broken?

[Zelaya] That is not true. There is now a recess because they are handing out copies of the government proposal to all political parties.

[Reporter] Dr (Julio Ruiz), a member of your party, believes the government gave an ultimatum to the opposition. You call it a proposal which will be discussed.

[Zelaya] Dr (Julio Ruiz) has his own opinion; I imagine he will express it within the party leadership. The directorate, which is the party's top authority, will ultimately determine the nature of this proposal. I do not believe it is an ultimatum.

I insist that we are now experiencing a very interesting period from a political standpoint. The FSLN is displaying a very different strategy in comparison to its early years. It is now presenting proposals, and its members are contradicting each other. For example, Commander Arce, as you will recall, flatly rejected any possibility for a dialogue with the contras. Four days later, however, Commander Ortega, at the Plaza of the Revolution, said just the opposite; Ortega said they were ready to discuss a cease-fire with the contras through his eminence the cardinal. I believe we are now on the right path. [end recording]

Meanwhile, Cesar Delgadillo, leader of the Popular Social Christian Party, described the proposals on the national dialogue presented by the government yesterday as acceptable. He said opposition parties established a commission to present an agenda on Thursday, which will address democratization and electoral issues.

[Begin Delgadillo recording] We believe the government proposal is apparently acceptable. All opposition parties met today to analyze views of all our organizations; each party expressed its view. A commission was established to gather all ideas and agreements reached during that meeting. This agenda will be presented next Thursday at 0900.

That agenda's first point deals with democratization; it touches on the government proposal on electoral aspects and the main amendments that should be made to the Constitution which will lead to democratization laws. The second point deals with war and peace under several subheads. The third main point deals with the economic crisis under several subheads to be discussed on Thursday.

We will wait and see whether the government will accept the entire agenda the opposition parties will present. [end recording]

Opposition To Present Counterproposal

PA192111 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Report by Edgar Barberena]

[Text] The presentation to the government of an opposition counterproposal on the national dialogue agenda as well as the talks between the opposition and President Daniel Ortega's delegates will be discussed this Thursday during the 11th dialogue session.

The opposition proposal, in which the Marxist-Leninist party did not participate, will include a proposal for discussing democratization in Nicaragua. Last Tuesday the government proposed an agenda for the dialogue, which cites the need to discuss subjects pertaining to future elections. The opposition has proposed reforms to the political Constitution and the repeal of certain laws such as the state of emergency law. Dr Julio Ramon Garcia Vilchez, from a faction of the Social Christian party headed by Dr Eduardo Rivas Gasteazoro, refers to this:

[Begin recording] [Garcia Vilchez] One of the main issues discussed at the national dialogue is the drafting of the agenda. In this regard we have presented our views. One of the main points that must be discussed and resolved in the national dialogue concerns democratization. Our party and others have also maintained that since the Sandinist government has already taken some steps toward attaining a cease-fire the problems of war

and peace would depend on the outcome of the government efforts to attain a cease-fire. If a cease-fire is attained, that would be an initial step toward peace. We believe this national dialogue should result in the approval of some measures for the country's democratization. What should be discussed regarding the democratization? Well, for example, one of the most fundamental issues for us is repealing the state of emergency law. Why? Because, the state of emergency law is precisely the denial of democratization. What is the purpose of the state of emergency law? The restriction of all of the citizens' rights. Therefore, if we do not have freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom of movement, freedom to organize groups, and if all the freedoms restricted by this law do not exist, then we cannot talk about democratization in Nicaragua.

In sum, one of the main points of this dialogue should be the democratization of the country. The agreements between the government and the opposition would depend on that democratization. Obviously, the democratization would also include reforms to the political Constitution, drafting a new election law, reforms to the laws on political parties, the new municipal code, the law of amparo, the writ of unconstitutionality, and other legal measures that must be adopted in order to have a de jure state and democratization in Nicaragua.

[Barberena] Dr Garcia Vilchez, what are your views regarding the peace and war problem, which has also been analyzed by some opposition politicians?

[Garcia Vilchez] Well, as I was saying at the beginning of this interview, we believe that this is a subject that requires some measures that are within the exclusive purview of the government. That is the spirit and the letter of the Esquipulas agreements. Since the government, in its own way, has taken some steps toward attaining a cease-fire, we believe that in this dialogue we should refer specifically to other aspects, such as the political, economic, and the social aspects, within the framework of the country's democratization.

[Barberena] Dr Garcia Vilchez, what are your views on the dialogue prospects for the rest of this year?

[Garcia Vilchez] Look, for us this dialogue must end with specific results. If this dialogue has not yielded positive results—even if such results are minimal—by 5 December, the date when the International Verification and Follow-Up Commission will start its first certifications, then I believe there is no reason to extend this dialogue beyond some 2, 3, 4, or 5 months. The situation would cool off and we will not be able to reach in the short term the peace and democratization that Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan people demand. [end recording]

Panama

Torrijist Front To 'Demand' PRD Reorganization

PA200422 Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 0354 GMT 20 Nov 87

[Text] The district Torrijist Front, composed of representatives from the Panama corregimientos, will continue its sessions tomorrow to confront the cabinet crisis that has been recently rumored. It will also demand reorganization of the PRD [Democratic Revolutionary Party] CEN [National Executive Committee]. The Torrijist Front feels the rank and file should determine this reorganization.

Argentina

Alfonsin Faults 'Permanent Oppositionists'

PY192109 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1445 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 19 Nov (TELAM)—President Raul Alfonsin, in his speech this morning opening the regular annual meeting of the Agricultural-Livestock Intercooperative Confederation (Coninagro), criticized permanent oppositionists: We already know what they do not want, and they are unable to determine what they do want.

He said criticism is positive when it provides serious, responsible, and possible solutions, but he rejected systematic criticism because it disregards even positive points, because it creates uneasiness, and because it seeks to destroy not only the government but also the nation itself.

He made a fiery defense of the tax package the government submitted to Congress, and urged the people to have confidence in the congressmen in charge of evaluating these projects: They are your representatives and they will responsibly evaluate these measures and adopt the best possible solutions.

Alfonsin made these remarks before a large group of representatives of agricultural and livestock organizations at the auditorium of the Argentine National Bank. In his speech he announced that in 1988 the country will receive credits from the IDB and the World Bank for the rural sector. He said that, God willing, these will be the largest credits granted to the agricultural and livestock sector in many years.

He said: We are aware that the agricultural and livestock sectors in the country and in the government are often tested, but we must never give up faith, not even in the most difficult moments. [passage omitted]

Draft Defense Law Under Consideration

PY191817 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1422 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 18 Nov (NA)—According to an article published in a morning newspaper of this capital, as a military instrument for national defense, the Armed Forces will not be allowed to intervene in situations that pertain to internal security, in accordance with the draft defense law that has been drawn up by Radicals and Peronists.

The draft law indicates that "the fundamental difference that separates national defense from internal security must always be taken into account when dealing with matters pertaining to national defense."

The norms pertaining to defense were published today by the newspaper *Ambito Financiero*, which prints the 45 articles that have been drafted by a joint committee of Defense Ministry authorities, headed by Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena, and a committee made up of members of the main opposition party [Justicialist Party]. The two committees will meet again this afternoon.

Article 2 of the draft establishes that "national defense is the coordinated integration and action of all of the nation's forces in seeking a solution to those conflicts that (?involve) the use of the Armed Forces as a dissuasive measure or [words indistinct] (?aggressions) of an external nature."

It adds that "its aim is to permanently guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the Argentine nation, its territorial integrity, and its self-determination capability, and to protect the life and freedom of its inhabitants."

Article 5 indicates that "national defense encompasses the continental territory, the Malvinas, Georgias, and Sandwich Islands, other insular and maritime territories, and airspace belonging to the Argentine Republic."

Regarding continental territory, the Argentine Antarctic sector is highlighted "with the scope that it has been assigned by international norms and the treaties that have been or are to be signed by the nation."

In accordance with Article 9, the national defense structure is headed by the president of the nation, with the help—in the exercise of its constitutional powers—of the national Congress, the Defense Ministry, the Armed Forces Joint Staff, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Border Patrol, and the Naval Prefecture, and by the nation's people.

The people are encompassed within the structure through "their active participation in essential defense matters, both in peace and in war."

The National Defense Council is also created and "it will assist and advise the president in evaluating conflicting hypotheses regarding war, in developing the strategy to determine the hypotheses of convergence [confluencia], and in preparing and coordinating the necessary plans of action to overcome any given situation." (Article 12)

The second paragraph of Article 13 specifically establishes that "as a military instrument of national defense, the Armed Forces cannot intervene in situations that pertain to internal security."

It adds that "the disaster situations that are contemplated in the attached annex will be taken into account exclusively under the terms of the laws that govern civil defense when taking into consideration the planning, at

all levels, and the assignment of missions and functions of the organs and organizations of the defense sector, which include the Armed Forces."

Regarding the National Defense Council, its members will include, in addition to the president, the vice president, the ministers of the national cabinet, the presidents of the Defense Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and two members from said committees—one from the majority bloc and one from the bloc of the first minority."

Deadlock on Draft Unblocked

PY191820 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1239 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 19 Nov (NA)—The modification of an article that alluded negatively to the intervention of the Armed Forces in internal conflicts has definitely opened a path and has allowed Justicialists and Radicals to reach an agreement on the new defense law draft, and also allowed the Intransigents and Christian Democrats to express their support "in general terms."

The defense law draft could be approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 26 November in view of the consolidated agreement that was achieved yesterday. In a chat with *Noticias Argentinas*, Peronist National Deputy Alberto Lestelle said that the Senate could give its approval during the 1st week of December.

This information was released yesterday by Hernan Patino Meyer, Antonio Cafiero's adviser on military matters, who during the afternoon participated in the decisive meeting on the new defense law that was held at the Defense Ministry. The meeting was presided over by Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena.

The Democratic Center Union, which had been invited to the meeting, did not participate because it did not agree with the methodology that was used to reach an agreement about the revised document.

Patino Meyer stressed that the project, which has the approval of the two biggest political parties, was a Justicialist initiative to "unlock" the situation that emerged in the Chamber of Deputies, and which had delayed the debate on the official draft.

In this respect, he said that "this is our initiative; it was well received by the government, and it has been successful in the short term."

He also explained that in the meeting to be held today the Consensus Board that is being promoted by the government will evaluate the defense law draft.

III Corps Denies Attack on Guard Post

PY191230 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 2216 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Cordoba, 18 Nov (DYN)—The III Corps, headquartered in this city, today denied that a guard post of the 141st Communications Battalion has been attacked, as was reported by news media that quoted police sources.

The Army issued a communique denying reports that unknown persons fired automatic weapons at a guard post of the 141st Communications Battalion at 0530 on 15 November.

According to these reports, two clips were apparently fired at the spotlights located atop the wall around the military unit.

The following is the text of the communique released by the III Corps:

"The III Corps wishes to inform the people at large that it categorically denies the news media reports about an alleged attack with firearms against a guard post of the 141st Communications Battalion, headquartered in Parque Sarmiento.

"Furthermore, it states that the commander of the 141st Communications Battalion has not reported any such attack, and that the chief of the provincial police has made it clear that his organization has not released any press communique on the alleged attack."

New Army Chain of Command Appointed

PY162340 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1915 GMT 13 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 13 Nov (NA)—The commanders of the four Army corps, the Army deputy chief, and the Army inspector general were confirmed in their posts today by Army Chief of Staff General Dante Caridi who announced the new chain of command after 20 high-ranking officers were retired following the serious Holy Week crisis.

Gen Caridi announced the new chain of command during a meeting of generals during which they "analyzed the general situation of the military." The generals also "evaluated the annual exercises recently carried out by the force."

Today at noon, the generals on active duty lunched with Defense Minister Horacio Jaunarena and discussed the modernization of the Army and the progress attained in the preparation of a new defense law.

According to an official report, the new chain of command is as follows:

Army Chief of Staff: Major General Jose Segundo Dante Caridi;

Deputy Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Miguel Wenceslao Abbate;

Army Inspector General: Brigadier General Enrique Jorge Bianchi;

Military Institutes Director General: Brigadier General Francisco Eduardo Gassino;

Army Superior Institutes Director: Brigadier General Osvaldo Cordoba;

Army Training Institutes Director: Colonel Francisco Picardo Salas;

II Corps Commander: Brigadier General Juan Ramon Mabragana;

III Corps Commander: Brigadier General Roberto Felipe Dominguez;

IV Corps Commander: Brigadier General Valentin Venier;

V Corps Commander: Brigadier General Humberto Esteban Pompillo Ferrucci;

Military Industries Deputy Director General: Brigadier General Raul Ricardo Matiuzzi;

Joint Staff Department "C" Chief: Brigadier General Eugenio Pedro O'Higgins;

Joint Staff Operations Chief: Brigadier General Heriberto Justo Avel;

Army Staff Programming Director: Brigadier General Alfredo Manuel Arrillaga;

Department I Army Staff Personnel Department Chief: Colonel Mario Candido Diaz;

Department II Army Staff Intelligence Department Chief: Colonel Eduardo Antonio Cardozo;

Department III Army Staff Operations Deputy Chief: Colonel Enrique Benito Laurenti (in charge of leadership);

Department IV Army Staff Logistics Department Deputy Chief: Colonel Ricardo Felipe Metalonium (in charge of leadership);

Institutional Affairs Director: Colonel Miguel Enrique Chichizola;

Support Director General: Brigadier General Pablo Skalany;

Planning Director: Brigadier General Francisco Eduardo Machinandiarena;

Military Attache to the Argentine Embassy in the United States: Brigadier General Martin Felix Bonet;

Army Staff General Inspection Chief: Colonel Raul Julio Gomez Sabaini;

Army Staff Military Institutes Director General: Colonel Jorge Luis Toccalino;

Army Staff Support Director General: Colonel Bartolome Antonio Trias;

Military Industries General Directorate Production Director: Colonel Jose Luis Cayetano Torres;

Military Industries General Directorate Development Director: Colonel Roberto Eduardo Jatuff.

1st Armored Cavalry Brigade Commander: Brigadier General Isidro Bonifacio Caceres;

2nd Armored Cavalry Brigade Comander: Colonel Hugo Sabino Fernandez;

3rd Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander (acting): Colonel Camilo Angel Colotti;

4th Airborne Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Adolfo Patricio Erchehun;

5th Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Carlos Farwing;

6th Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Martin Antonio Balza;

8th Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Jorge Norberto Apa;

9th Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander (acting): Colonel Jorge Haperin;

10th Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Eugenio Alfredo Dalton;

11th Infantry Brigade Commander: Colonel Horacio Guillermo Canestro;

12th Infantry Brigade Deputy Commander (acting): Colonel Miguel Angel Armua;

Arsenal Director: Colonel Hector Hugo Gargiulo;

Quartermaster: General Juan Valentin de Iriarte;

Health Director: Colonel Jorge Morena;

Army General Accounting Director: Colonel Miguel Angel di Cio;

Army Judicial Adviser: Colonel Alberto Luis Borla;

Remount and Veterinary Director: Colonel Juan Carlos Neyertz;

Communications Director: Colonel Guillermo Manuel Petrina;

Military College Director: Colonel Oscar Osvaldo Salomon;

Military Lyceums Director: Colonel Manuel Antonio Batto;

Aide to the Army Staff: Colonel Raul Bauza;

Deputy Director of the National Defense School: Colonel Roberto Romeo Bin.

The appointment of General Heriberto Auel as Joint Staff Operations commander is mentioned in the new chain of command.

A military source today stated that this appointment has "great importance" for the modernization plans for the Army, which the government has been promoting since it come to power in 1983.

Auel was one of the high-ranking officers who played a decisive part in the drawing up of programs and plans for the military reform.

His name was constantly mentioned during the April crisis as one of the officers who managed to get the militarymen, who had confined themselves at the Infantry School, to surrender.

Another noteworthy appointment is that of General Francisco Jose Gassino as director of the Military Institutions, for which he left his post as head of Department II, Intelligence.

The post as head of Institutions will also be of great importance since the Military Schools are under his command. One of these schools—the Infantry School—was the scene of the April rebellion.

Another notable appointment is that of General Mario Candido Diaz as Staff Personnel Department chief. Diaz has thus left his post as chief of the General Lemos Combat Support School, where former Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico remains under arrest.

Following the 2-day meeting, the Army Staff released the following communique:

"Complying with its annual program of activities, the Army Command met at its headquarters in the Libertador Building on 12 and 13 November.

"The meeting was presided over by Army Chief of Staff Maj Gen Jose Segundo Dante Caridi, and attended by: Army Staff Deputy Chief Brig Gen Miguel Wenceslao Abbate; Army Inspector General Brig Gen Enrique Jorge Bianchi; the commanders of the II, III, IV, and V Corps—Brigadier Generals Juan Ramon Mabragana, Roberto Felipe Dominguez, Valentin Osvaldo Venier, and Humberto Esteban Pompillo Ferrucci, respectively; Military Industries Deputy Director General Brig Gen Raul Mattiuzi; and Army Staff Department II, Intelligence Chief Brig Gen Francisco Gassino.

"Following tradition, on the first day the chief of staff was informed about the general situation in each military jurisdiction, and in this case, he listened to an evaluation of the annual military exercises carried out recently.

"During the 2d day, the Army Staff directors and chiefs gave reports on specific aspects of their jurisdiction, and the chief of staff announced the new chain of command.

"After the aforementioned activities, another meeting was held with the commanders of the large combat units, all the unit chiefs, and chiefs of Army institutions and organizations, who on 13 November concluded a course for the rank they will hold in 1988.

"In the presence of all the officers mentioned, the chief of staff gave his orders for the next year."

New Appointments in Navy Command Announced

PY181938 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1622 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 18 Nov (TELAM)—The Navy chief of staff, Vice Admiral Ramon Arosa, today made new appointments in the Navy command.

This was reported by a Navy source, who added that Vice Admiral Maximo Rivero Kelly was confirmed in his post as deputy Navy chief of staff, and Vice Admiral Barry Malbourne Hussey was confirmed as deputy chief of the Joint Staff.

Rear Admiral Adolfo Arduino was appointed commander of Navy operations, and Captain Alberto Cesar Gonzalez, who has been nominated for promotion to rear admiral, was named chief of the presidential household.

Rear Admiral Jose Maria Arriola was appointed to the Inter-American Defense Board, while Rear Admiral Jorge Osvaldo Ferrer will continue to be Argentine naval attache in Washington.

Rear Admiral Hector Albino Martini will be commander of naval aviation, and Rear Admiral Juan Carlos Anchezar will remain general director of Navy personnel.

Rear Admiral Emilio Jose Osses will stay on as commander of the sea fleet for another year, and Rear Admiral Rodolfo Orlando Tettamanti was appointed chief of the Joint Staff Planning Department.

Rear Admiral Julio Roberto Degrange was appointed general director of Navy materiel, and Rear Admiral Alberto Ramon Varela was appointed chief of the Navy intelligence service.

Rear Admiral Emilio Nigoul will continue to be naval instruction director; Rear Admiral Juan Vilgiero will remain director of the Navy's welfare department; Rear Admiral, Navy Infantry, Fernando Jose Garcia will continue as navy infantry commander.

Rear Admiral Alberto Eduardo Alonso was appointed chief of the Navy Operations Staff Command, and Rear Admiral Antonio Jose Mozarelli was named director of the Navy General Staff.

Rear Admiral Oscar Carlos Albino will be in charge of the Puerto Belgrano naval area, and Rear Admiral Oscar Jorge Calandra will remain general secretary of the Navy.

Captain Favio Heberto Jose Lisa was appointed chief of organization of the Navy staff, and Captain Juan Carlos Bou was named chief of the southern naval region. Both have been proposed for promotion to rear admiral.

Rear Admiral Eduardo Coppola will stay on as Navy auditor general; Rear Admiral, accountant, Alfredo Lepera will continue to be the Navy comptroller general; and Rear Admiral, physician, Hugo Ruben Scavuzzo will remain director of the Navy health department.

Discussions of Armies Conference Conclude
PY191446 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 0200 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Report by reporter Horacio Barrios on the ongoing 17th Conference of the Armies of the Americas being held in Mar del Plata]

[Excerpt] The title of the draft that has been submitted by the Argentine Army is: Methods To Combat Terrorism. This draft was approved today by the Conference of the Armies of the Americas. This document, which was (?drafted) by Committee No 3, headed by [name indisticnt], centers on a possible connection between guerrilla activities and drug trafficking in Latin America. [passage indistinct].

The different committees ended their work today and it is expected that pertinent agreements will be signed on 19 November.

General Adolfo Blandon, the Salvadoran chief of staff, said that the Conference of the Armies of the Americas deals exclusively with military and professional matters. Regarding the U.S. position in Latin America, Blandon said: I believe the United States should show more interest in Latin America than in other countries that are far from its territory, such as Israel, Turkey and other countries in the Middle East.

He added: The United States currently allots 2 percent of its aid to Latin American countries. I believe this is unjust; I think the United States should give more attention to Latin American countries and be just in its distribution of resources.

Regarding other issues discussed within the framework of the Conference of the Armies of the Americas, Blandon said the following:

[Begin recording, in progress] [Blandon] ...terrorism throughout Latin America. The conference deals exclusively with military and professional matters. I personally believe that the recommendations I may submit to President Duarte will be quite useful for his policy.

[Reporter] Do you think the existence of Nicaragua and Cuba in Central America [as heard] and the guerrilla situation in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia are the result of an erroneous U.S. Central America policy?

[Blandon] Undoubtedly, there are great mistakes in U.S. foreign policy. I believe the U.S. should show greater interest in Latin America than in countries many thousands of miles from its territory. The United States is currently dedicating 74 percent of its foreign aid to countries such as Israel and Turkey, and other countries in that area, while only 2 percent of its foreign aid goes to Latin American countries. I believe this is unjust because whenever the United States [passage indistinct] I believe the Latin American foreign debt would not be as heavy a burden if we were not confronting the problems we are currently facing.

[Reporter] General, (?is there a belief) that narcoterrorism is a new source of conflict in Latin America?

[Blandon] I believe it is a temporary situation. I think we should [words indistinct] between drug trafficking and terrorism because drug traffickers only seek personal gains while the political issue is merely a temporary situation. At a given time this relation may be broken. This means that although the political situation may end, the drug trafficking situation can still continue.

Everyone is aware that $40 million is spent daily in the United States on drugs. This means that this subject must occupy an important place in U.S. security strategy because a country cannot only rely on short- or long-range missiles. It must also control what is directly influencing the minds of young generations.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] concept in Latin America, do you believe narcoterrorism is a problem in Latin America or is it just an issue of interest for the United States because a great deal of drugs are consumed there?

[Blandon] No, I believe it is also an issue of interest for some Latin American countries such as Colombia because drug trafficking and terrorism are closely linked in Colombia. However, I think these are issues that the government and the Armed Forces must handle separately because [words indistinct] [passage omitted] [end recording].

Envoy Returns to Paraguay After 2 Months

PY192055 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 2032 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 19 Nov (DYN)—Argentine Ambassador to Paraguay Raul Quijano today left for Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital. Quijano is going back to Asuncion after staying for 2 months in Buenos Aires to protest the Paraguayan Government's refusal to grant the extradition of some former Argentine policemen who are seeking missing children.

Quijano is going in the company of Alberto Ferrari Etcheverry, under secretary for Latin American affairs of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, who is carrying an Argentine Government proposal to find "a political solution" to have the children returned to their legitimate families.

Navy Chief Meets Chile's Rivera Calderon

PY181755 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 1500 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 18 Nov (TELAM)—Navy Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Ramon Arosa today held a protocol meeting with his Chilean Navy colleague, Vice Admiral Hernan Rivera Calderon, who is on an official visit to Argentina.

According to Navy sources, during the meeting, Arosa and Rivera, who was welcomed at the Navy building by an honor guard, discussed institutional issues and ways to increase professional exchanges.

Joint Naval Exercises With Uruguay Staged

PY171501 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 2134 GMT 16 Nov 87

[Text] Buenos Aires, 16 Nov (DYN)—The so-called "Cimarron IX" exercise will conclude on 23 November. This is a regular exercise that is carried out by units of the Argentine and Uruguayan navies.

These operations are part of the cooperation and professional exchange plans in the naval field between the two countries and they are carried out in the River Plate and Atlantic Ocean.

The following Argentine vessels are taking part: the missile-carrying destroyer *Almirante Brown*, the corvettes *Rosales* and *Drummond*, and the submarine *San Luis*, while Uruguay is participating with the destroyer *18 de Julio*, the minesweeper *Rio Negro*, and the support vessel *Huracan*. Naval aircraft units of the two countries are also participating in the operation.

The "Cimarron IX" exercise began on 5 November and will conclude on 23 November, when the Argentine units will return to their base at Puerto Belgrano.

Brazil

Further Response to U.S. Economic Sanctions

Abreu Sodre Cited

PY191447 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network in Portuguese 0900 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Foreign Minister Abreu Sodre yesterday said that the Brazilian Government will not do anything regarding U.S. threats of economic retaliation against Brazil until the list of possible articles to be affected by the retaliation is released in Washington.

Abreu Sodre made this statement yesterday during a meeting with businessmen in the shoe manufacturing sector, which annually exports $900 million worth of shoes to the U.S. market.

Minister Says No Conflict

PY200155 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 19 Nov 87

[By Oscar Lobo from Florianopolis]

[Text] Brazil is not seeking a confrontation with the United States, but it will not give up its scientific and technological autonomy, Minister Henrique da Silveira said here today. He added that Brazil has no reason to fear U.S. sanctions, which would show disrespect for our policy of reserving the data processing market.

[Begin Da Silveira recording] The United States has announced sanctions but it has not retaliated so far. The level of complexity between the two economies is very great. Just as the United States can make it difficult for Brazil to sell its products in the U.S. market, we can also make it difficult for that country to sell its products to Brazil.

Brazil purchases a large amount of electronic products made in the Orient and then resold by the United States. In a situation like this, Brazil might simply decide to buy those products directly from the source. [end recording]

Brossard, Netto Clash on EBN Appointments

PY200238 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 18 Nov 87 p 2

[Text] Brasilia—Justice Minister Paulo Brossard does not accept the three directors of the *Brazilian News Agency* [EBN] designated by its new president, former presidential spokesman Frota Netto.

Early yesterday evening Brossard visited President Jose Sarney to tell him that he does not accept the appointments made by Frota Netto, because although they were already published by the official *Gazette*, they were not approved by the Justice Ministry, to which the EBN is subordinate. A confrontation has begun between the Justice Ministry and Planalto Palace.

Sarney told Brossard that he had signed the appointment decrees, but that he had asked Civil Household Chief Costa Couto to talk over the situation with him. Brossard told Sarney that he had not received any information from Costa Couto. For this reason he will not approve the designations and will not install the new directors.

An obvious impasse has been created, and as of late last night, the justice minister had not presented his resignation. On the contrary, Brossard is ready to react. He set Thursday for Frota Netto's installation as his subordinate, but he will not accept the appointment of the three directors. He claims he does not know them.

The justice minister has also reacted against Planalto Palace's decision to announce the replacement of the EBN directors, when none of them, in fact, has presented a letter of resignation. The only one who tendered his resignation is Rui Lopes, former EBN president, who was replaced by Frota Netto a few weeks ago.

Survey Views Constituent Assembly Popularity

PY181819 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 17 Nov 87 p 3

[All figures as published]

[Text] Sixty-four percent of electors in Greater Rio de Janeiro and metropolitan regions of Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte think the performance of the Constituent Assembly is bad or very bad. Only 23 percent think that federal senators and deputies in the assembly are performing well or very well. If elections were held today, 45 percent of those surveyed would not vote for the same deputies and senators they helped elect on 15 November 1986.

These are the results of an IBOPE [Brazilian Public Opinion and Statistics Institute] survey carried out exclusively for *O Globo*. The pollsters consulted with 800 electors on 14 and 15 November, the same weekend the Systematization Commission reduced President Sarney's presidential term by 2 years and approved the implementation of a parliamentarian system of government as of March 1988.

The survey's first question was: "How would you rate the work of federal senators and deputies in the Constituent Assembly?" Three percent of those surveyed said "very well," 20 percent said "well," 27 percent said "bad," and 37 percent said "very bad."

When we add the negative responses we discover that 64 percent of those surveyed disapprove of the constituents' performance. When we add the positive responses, that federal deputies and senators performed "well" or "very well," we have a total of 23 percent. The largest sector of people who think that the performance of the constituents is very bad live in Greater Rio de Janeiro (39 percent), while the largest percentage of those who think constituents' performance is good (36 percent) live in the Belo Horizonte metropolitan region.

Another question that was only asked to those who elected at least one deputy or senator last November was: "In view of the performance of your candidate in the Constituent Assembly, would you vote for him again?" A total of 50 percent of those surveyed said yes (44 percent live in Greater Belo Horizonte, 51 percent in Greater Rio de Janeiro, and 51 percent in Greater Sao Paulo). A total of 45 percent of those surveyed said they would not vote again for the same candidate (45 percent live in Belo Horizonte, 44 percent in Rio de Janeiro, and 46 percent in Sao Paulo).

The same question was asked of those who did not have any of their candidates elected. The results show that 42 percent would vote for the same candidate again, and that 40 percent would not. The largest number of those who would vote for the same candidates again that lost in November 1986 live in Rio de Janeiro (61 percent).

Regarding political parties in the Senate, 42 percent of those surveyed chose the PMDB, 9 percent chose the PDT [Democratic Labor Party], 3 percent the PDS [Social Democratic Party], 2 percent chose the PFL, and 1 percent the PL [Liberal Party].

In the last elections, 31 percent of those surveyed voted for the PMDB, 10 percent for the PDT, 9 percent for the PT, 4 percent for the PTB [Brazilian Labor Party], 4 percent for the PDS, 3 percent for the PFL, 1 percent for the PL, and 1 percent for the PC do B.

The survey also revealed that 49 percent of those surveyed voted for candidates that were finally elected to the Senate, 22 percent voted for candidates that were not elected, and 15 percent did not know if their candidates were elected or not.

In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, 44 percent of those surveyed voted for candidates that were elected, 24 percent voted for candidates that were not elected, and 18 percent did not know if their candidates were elected or not.

Guimaraes Leaves Hospital; Speaks to Press

PY191830 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 1500 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Deputy Ulysses Guimaraes, president of the Constituent Assembly, today left the Heart Institute in Sao Paulo. Guimaraes has been resting at the Heart Institute since 16 November when he underwent an angioplasty for an obstruction to a heart artery. Guimaraes said he will return to Brasilia next week and that he is already feeling well. Guimaraes will remain in Sao Paulo over the weekend to review the 50 or so amendments that have been submitted to change the internal regulations of the Constituent Assembly. Guimaraes also said that he will assume the presidency during Sarney's trip to Mexico on 26 November. He further predicted that the new constitution will be approved.

[Begin Guimaraes recording] We have to return to the study of the constitution as soon as possible. I am optimistic. I think we are going to do just that, and sooner than a lot of people expect. We already know what topics must be considered first, we know what topics must be improved, we know what the critical points are. We will make an effort at reconciliation, and only if this is not possible will we resort to the vote. I think we will surprise the nation with the promulgation of this constitution.

We must pray that we are right. I have always tried to avoid infighting, and when things were really difficult I said: Let us pray that we are choosing the government system that is the most effective and beneficial for the nation. [end recording]

High Command Releases Army Promotions List

PY181628 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 17 Nov 87 p 10

[Text] Brasilia - The Army High Command yesterday disclosed the names of the four major generals who will be promoted to the rank of general. They are: Everaldo de Oliveira Reis, Mario Orlando Ribeiro Sampaio, Wilberto Luiz Lima, and Luiz da Silva Vasconcellos.

Maj Gen Wilberto Luiz Lima is the first adviser of Walter Pires, Army minister during President Figueiredo's administration, to be promoted to general and to the High Command. Lima was the chief of the Army Ministry's cabinet in the initial phases of Figueiredo's goverment. Lima was also attache to the Brazilian Embassy to Washington when Walter Pires underwent bypass surgery in the United States.

The four seats in the High Command were opened by the death of Army Chief of Staff Fernando Valente Pamplona, the retirement of Northeast Military Commander Democrito Correa da Cunha, and the designation of Generals Haroldo Erichesen da Fonseca and Jorge Frederico Machado de Santanna to the Military Supreme Court.

The following five brigadier generals will be promoted to major general: Luiz Gonzaga de Oliveira, Guilherme Jose da Rocha, Roberto Pacifico Barboza, Zenildo Zoroastro de Lucena ,and Theodomiro Serra Filho. The list of nine [not further identified] includes General Job Lorena de Santana, who headed the inquiry into the Riocentro affair [reference unknown].

The list of colonels to be promoted to brigadier general includes Leone da Silveira Lee, Jose Luiz Lopes da Silva, Nialdo Neves de Oliveira Bastos, Luiz Antonio Rodriguez Mendes Ribeiro, and Alvaro Augusto Alves Pinto. Two new seats will be opened in the Army High Command in March: Generals Ivan Dentice Linhares and Edson Boscacci Guedes will go to the active reserve on that date.

Generator Failure Halts Nuclear Plant's Work

PY191719 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 18 Nov 87 p 1

[Text] According to a timetable drawn up by the Siemens Company to repair an electric generator that experienced a short-circuit in June 1987, the Angra I nuclear power plant will only resume operations in October 1988. This information was supplied yesterday by Ayrton Caubit, the technical superintendant for nuclear matters of the Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc [FCE].

The paralyzation will cause a financial loss to the FCE totaling $11 million (652.3 million cruzados): $7.5 million in lost invoicing, resulting from the power plant's paralyzation, and $3.5 million charged by the Siemens Company for the repairs.

The FCE may take further legal action against the Westinghouse Company.

Chile

Opposition Leaders in U.S. To Discuss Affairs

PY191448 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 0930 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Three opposition leaders are now in Washington to discuss Chile's internal political affairs. These leaders are Andres Zaldivar Larrain, of the Christian Democratic Party [PDC]; Enrique Silva Cimma, a leader of one of the Radical Party factions; and Ricardo Nunez, a leader of one of the Socialist Party factions.

Silva Cimma and Nunez are also participating in a meeting of the Socialist International in the U.S. capital to discuss Chilean domestic affairs.

During a news conference Silva Cimma and Nunez admitted that there is disagreement in the PDC concerning Chile's current and future political situation. Zaldivar Larrain did not attend this conference.

Silva Cimma and Nunez added that they, along with other groups opposing President Pinochet, will try to form a single party to confront the government even if the PDC does not join this single party.

In Washington the leaders hope to meet with Elliott Abrams, the U.S. State Department assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and with adviser Robert Gelbard. The three men admitted that a report published by *The Washington Post* stating that the Santiago newspaper *La Epoca* is experiencing economic difficulties due to poor sales is accurate.

4 Arrested in Temuco for Smuggling Weapons

PY182102 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 18 Nov 87

[Report from Temuco]

[Text] Personnel of the Lautaro investigative police, headed by Officer Helmut Balboa, yesterday afternoon arrested three passengers and a bus driver of the La Union Transport Co. who were returning to our country, specifically to Temuco.

According to information obtained so far, those arrested were charged with violating the law on the control of weapons and explosive devices and with smuggling them into the country.

It was learned that the arrested people have been identified as: Argentine citizen Nestor Oldinio Ponat Lirio and his accomplice Anibal Aldana Diaz, a Chilean citizen who resides in Argentina; Segundo Cerda Candia, a Chilean citizen residing in Argentina, who was driving the bus; and (Joel Villa Carrasco), a Chilean citizen residing in Temuco.

At the time of their arrest these individuals were found with small boxes containing approximately 2,700 rounds of ammunition for small-caliber weapons and some welding torches.

The individuals and the items seized will be placed at the disposal of the Temuco military prosecutor this afternoon.

Reportage on Bombings; No Injuries Reported

Blackout in 9th Region

PY191928 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Report from Temuco]

[Text] Last night a terrorist attack against a high-voltage electrical tower caused a blackout in the 9th region, De la Araucania.

The blackout, which was rectified after 15 minutes of expeditiously conducted repairs by specialized personnel, occurred at 2242.

The blackout was caused by the explosion of a powerful bomb placed at the base of a high-voltage electrical tower located at the foot of the Nielol Hill near Temuco's northern access road, 6 km from Temuco.

The electrical tower was seriously damaged. (?The damage was finally) repaired.

Anonymous telephone calls received by several news media claimed that this subversive action was perpetrated by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front.

The cities located between Los Angeles, 160 km north of Temuco, and Loncoche, 83 km south of Temuco, were seriously affected by this interruption of their electrical power supply.

Bank, Church Attacked

PY192012 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Janitors at the Nunoa National Bank branch this morning removed a large number of pieces of glass from 10 windows shattered by a bomb last night. Carabineros reported that a 100-gram dynamite bomb operated by a clock mechanism went off at the northern door of the National Bank branch at 43 Jose Pedro Alessandri Street. It also damaged other parts of the building. The police said that despite the alarm caused by the blast no one was injured and nearby buildings were not damaged.

Carabineros have also reported that unknown people detonated a fire bomb in front of a Mormom church in La Florida, at the corner of Vicente Valdes and Juan Pineda Streets. Two Molotov cocktails, which had not detonated, were found in the area. Several leaflets saying Yankees Go Home, and Che is Alive were found in the area. The leaflets were signed by the so-called Lautaro Youth Movement. No damage or injuries were reported.

City Hall Damaged

PY192021 Santiago Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Excerpt] Dozens of people could have been killed in a terrorist attack last night had it not been for the delay in the detonation of a bomb. At 2345 last night a bomb went off in the square in front of La Cisterna City Hall. The bomb contained almost 2 kg of dynamite and several pieces of metal shrapnel.

Mayor (Gonzalo Stefani) said the most dramatic aspect of the situation is that the square is usually visited by children.

[Begin (Stefani) recording] At 2340 last night a bomb went off at a city hall facility in the 24th block of Gran Avenida. The bomb caused over 1,000,000 pesos in damage to the municipal revenue office. This is very serious because 15 minutes earlier a circus was performing in the area. Children and parents were enjoying themselves in this area, known as Parque 5 of La Cisterna. This is a very beautiful small square that we have just dedicated where people come for enjoyment.

If the blast had occurred 15 minutes earlier it would have had tragic results. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Colombia

UP Leader Interviewed by Havana Television

FL171915 Havana Tele-Rebelde Network in Spanish 1416 GMT 16 Nov 87

[Interview with Cesar Martinez, leader of the Patriotic Union, "who is recuperating at the Hermanos Ameijeiras Hospital from a terrorist attack by an ultrarightist paramilitary group in Barrancabermeja, where he was a member of the municipal council," by an unidentified woman reporter; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Comrade Cesar, what is the Patriotic Union [UP]?

[Martinez] The UP can be defined as a broad political movement in which diverse political forces can come together. It is open to liberals, conservatives, the working class, the skilled workers, communists, socialists, those who belong to no party, Christians, other creeds. This is one of the definitions of the UP, which has had great influence, great development in Colombian political life. I believe this is precisely why the enemy has prepared for it. It is afraid of a democratic, national convergence movement such as the UP. It wants to save its interests; it is afraid of losing its interests. This is the first time out for the UP, but it has already been able to take hold in the minds of the Colombian peasantry, which is tired, frustrated. We can say that the same enthusiasm exists for the UP in the cities.

[Reporter] Could you explain to our viewers what the popular election of mayors means? Why has the UP given this top priority as one of the principal objectives of its struggle?

[Martinez] We are giving it priority because this makes it possible to break up the bipartisan power-sharing now existing on the political scene in Colombia. This came about with the national front through a 1957 reform by which the two traditional parties took control. They have distributed bureaucratic jobs among themselves. They use judicial power on a bipartisan basis. They are the ones that handle all administrative positions in Colombia. The mayors are arbitrarily appointed by the governors. This antidemocratic system cannot go on.

[Reporter] Although the UP has chosen to effect its democratic program within the structures established by the bourgeois society in Colombia, the organization has been the target of a large number of attacks on its leaders and community-level workers. What do you think are the causes for this escalation of violence in present-day Colombia?

[Martinez] I would say that the Colombian bourgeoisie is scared of the development, the progress, of the UP. They are afraid, because the Colombian bourgeoisie has been spoiled by its representation in both traditional parties. It had been governing the country any way it wanted to. Now, this movement has emerged. The bourgeoisie in Colombia is very strong, very oligarchic, as we ourselves say. Its weapon is the Armed Forces, which are extremely reactionary and anticommunist. They will not allow the leftist forces to gain ground, they will not allow the revolutionary forces to gain ground. Pro-fascist militarism is involved in this new kind of violence; the big landowners are involved in this new kind of violence; U.S. imperialism is involved in this new kind of violence. This all fits in with American security plans. They practiced it in Argentina and it cost them 30,000 missing persons. The same goes for Brazil, Uruguay. There is a dictatorship just as nefarious in Chile today. It's even worse in Colombia because we have a very large guerrilla movement. So, imperialism has trained its sights on Colombia, just as it has on El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Imperialism has designed what we know as the Condor Plan, which is a plan of selective assassination, of extermination, beginning with the leaders of the revolutionary movement.

[Reporter] What do you think the Colombian masses' response will be to this escalation of violence?

[Martinez] I think that their response has been good. The response to the crimes have shown as much: civil strikes, mass movements, mass actions. It was evident with the assassination of Comrade Jaime Pardo Leal, after which thousands—millions—of people demonstrated, to protest the crime against Pardo Leal.

But I do believe that within the combination of all forms of struggle the Colombian people are engaged in, protest should be developed further, raised to a degree that will make it a more forceful response. You have demonstrations, civic strikes, protests, all the people stop, but mass action doesn't work against these paramilitary groups. That is why I believe we need a more forceful response by [words indistinct].

[Reporter] Do you think that response can come through the guerrilla unity forged recently in the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Committee?

[Martinez] I am very enthusiastic. The prospects are good. I do believe that [words indistinct]. Naturally, one mustn't engage in provocation. It is true that the guerrilla movement has given a political response, but it is also true that the guerrilla movement cannot sit with its arms crossed in such a situation. The guerrilla movement must act. Of course, it cannot act wildly, in an uncoordinated manner, or in anarchy. It is not going to be like that. But the truth is that there is a kind of war against us. As Comrade Bernardo Jaramillo said, Colombia could end up with a civil war in which we cannot be absent. The UP, the Communist Party, cannot be absent in this kind of civil war. We cannot allow them to keep killing us like that.

That is why I believe that in these things the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Committee has to respond. It has to respond to this series of crimes, because you are unarmed in the city. Of course, we will have to adopt other forms of struggle. I don't want to explain them here on television. We will know how to defend ourselves in Colombia. We know how we are going to use the various forms of struggle, and we expect the support of the guerrilla movement. This is the way to punish these individuals who can be punished perfectly well. Of course, if we end up with a civil war, we will have to deal with it, naturally. There will be losers and winners.

[Reporter] In other words, in your opinion the Colombian people are ready to confront the ultra-rightist escalation of repression.

[Martinez] I know this is so. They are ready to confront it, to face it, because in truth, comrade, given the large number of our courageous leaders they have killed, you would think that the Communist Party and the comrades of the UP would have said, let's go into exile, let's not allow them to murder us anymore. Yet, the slogan of the UP and the Communist Party is that no one will go into exile. We are going to face the music in Colombia. We are going to do battle with the paramilitary groups and the death squads in Colombia. No one runs away from Colombia. The comrade who runs away does not love Colombia or does not understand the Colombian problem. What the paramilitary groups want is for the communists and the comrades of the UP to flee so they can be free to act in Colombia and establish a regime of [words indistinct].

I feel that the situation in Colombia is creating greater popular action, which could lead to a revolutionary situation. And who is to say, comrade, that we won't end up close to seizing power? I want to finish right here.

[Reporter] Well, we wish success to Comrade Cesar Martinez in the popular struggle of the Colombian people. We thank him for appearing on "Revista de la Manana." Dear viewers, thank you for watching.

Paraguay

Police Cordon Off Radio, Laino's Home

PY191546 Asuncion HOY in Spanish 19 Nov 87 p 8

[Text] Around 1700 yesterday, Police cordoned off and restricted entrance by the public and employees of Radio Caritas following "orders from above." The measure was carried out by a strong police detachment.

The detachment left the area 30 minutes later, but three policemen remained at the entrance of the building under orders of Police Inspector Agustin Lovera from the 3d Police Precinct. Lovera told *Hoy*: "We are going to stay here. Those are our orders."

When asked why the police detachment was there, Lovera said: "They were here merely by chance. Only the three of us are going to stay." He made it clear that the public "will not be allowed inside the radio station," and added that radio employees will be able to enter the station after handing in their identifications. Lovera concluded by saying, "We are here only to fulfill an order from above. We do not know anything else."

At the same time Lovera was cordoning off Radio Caritas, another police detachment was cordoning off Domingo Laino's home. Laino is the president of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party [PLRA].

"I think both incidents, here in front of my home and in front of Radio Caritas, are related to the arrest by the local police of PLRA leader Sebastian Riveros from Itagua Guazu."

Laino said that Riveros was brought to the capital and today—meaning yesterday—"he was taken to the Police Security Detention Center." Laino said that Riveros "is loved by his community. I think an important group of people decided to come to the capital today to meet with the Asuncion archbishop to denounce his arrest."

At approximately 1830 yesterday, a delegation of Itagua Guazu peasants met with Laino at his home.

Briefs

Trade Deficit Reported

The Customs General Directorate and the Paraguay Central Bank have reported a trade-balance deficit of $234.2 million during the January-October period of this year. According to such reports, the gap results from imports worth $558.5 million and exports worth $324.3 million during that 10-month period. [Summary] *[Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 13 Nov 87 p 11 PY]*

Peru

Electricity Restored After Attacks in Lima

PA191409 Lima Panamericana de Television Network in Spanish 1300 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Electricity has been reestablished in virtually all of Lima after terrorists caused a blackout last night when they blew up approximately nine high tension towers in Chaclacayo, (Huaican), and San Juan de Miraflores.

The blackout coincided with a synchronized series of seditious attacks. There are unofficial reports that six people were killed. Officially it is reported that three terrorists were killed, two were wounded, and two were arrested.

Immediately after the blackout began at 2005, the terrorists began their usual orgy of terror and destruction. Public buildings, embassies, and business establishments were the target of subversive fury. Civil Guardsman Carlos Desosup was wounded when he defended an attack against the U.S. Embassy.

[Begin unidentified speaker recording] The subversives left the dynamite. [end recording]

The most serious incident occurred at the Nissan factory located in the Ingenieria neighborhood. An extremist commando group hiding in a bus set off seven explosions and tried to burn the factory. The quick action by the police led to a gunfight which left three terrorists dead, and two wounded; two terrorists were arrested. One of the dead terrorists was identified as Carlos Herrera Lazarte of the Sociology Department of San Marcos University.

As soon as the blackout began, the residents of Lima heard explosions and police sirens. Members of the Civil Guard, the Republican Guard, and the Investigative Police were sent to strategic buildings and locations.

In addition to the Nissan factory, the Health and Labor Ministries, and the Wiese Bank in the center of Lima, the Palace of Justice was also attacked, causing heavy damage. Several nearby buildings were also damaged by this new absurd, incomprehensible, and insane violence by terrorists.

Further on Factory Attack

PA192241 Lima Television Peruana in Spanish 1800 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] The police identified two of the five terrorists killed while fleeing the attack on the Nissan automobile assembly plant. Mario Andres Gonzalez and Jose Gamero Escobar are two of the subversives shot by the police last night. Their bodies are at the morgue.

The attack occurred minutes after a blackout affected the entire city. The five terrorists were part of a commando group of approximately 30 members who arrived at the plant aboard a bus. Witnesses said that three women were also in the group.

Shining Path Kills 12 in Southeastern Area

PA191247 Paris AFP in Spanish 0102 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Ayacucho, Peru, 19 Nov (AFP)—The authorities in Peru's southeastern Andean area confirmed today that the Shining Path guerrillas killed nine peasants, two policemen, and one teacher in the past 48 hours in various parts of that region. The authorities added that the guerrillas also wounded two farmers and dynamited a police station in the same area.

The most serious attack took place when a guerrilla group attacked the remote hamlet of Chinchay, 70 km northwest of Huanta. The guerrillas took peasants out of their homes and shot them for being "traitors to their people," said Moises Montes, a teacher who died yesterday at the Huanta hospital as a result of serious wounds.

After the massacre, the guerrillas looted and burned their victims' homes. After the dead were identified, they were buried in the same town. Colonel Carlos Leon, Huanta's political-military chief, then ordered a large operation to find the guerrillas.

Two policemen were murdered yesterday by subversive elements who attacked Ulcumayo, a town in Junin Department. They also destroyed the town's police station. Although the identity of the dead policemen was not given, Octavio Arredondo (32) and Rogelio Alcantara (28)—who were wounded in the attack—said about 20 seditious elements arrived in two trucks and—after haranguing the people—gave the police and municipal authorities a 48-hour deadline to resign their posts.

Uruguay

Hungarian President Nemeth Arrives

PY190143 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2326 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Montevideo, 19 Nov (EFE)—Hungarian President Karoly Nemeth today arrived in Uruguay for a 2-day official visit, during which he will meet with Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti and address the Uruguayan Congress.

Nemeth, who arrived from Brasilia, is the first Hungarian president to make an official visit to Uruguay.

President Sanguinetti and all his ministers welcomed the 15-member Hungarian delegation, including the Foreign Trade minister, and the deputy ministers of Foreign Affairs, Industry, and Agriculture and Food.

In the afternoon, Sanguinetti and Nemeth will hold their first private meeting, and then the Hungarian president will be welcomed in a special session of Congress (senators and deputies together), during which he will make a speech.

The two presidents will ratify a scientific and cultural cooperation agreement, and the rules of the Uruguayan-Hungarian Joint Commission, which were signed in July 1986, when Uruguayan Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias visited Budapest.

Official spokesmen have reported that Sanguinetti and Nemeth will talk about the international economic situation, the Central American issue, and bilateral relations. They will also sign a joint declaration.

Tomorrow, 20 November, Nemeth will visit the Supreme Court, receive the key to the city of Montevideo from Mayor Jorge Luiz Elizalde, and meet with the Hungarian community in Uruguay.

On Saturday and Sunday, the Hungarian delegation will make a private visit to Punta del Este, the main Uruguayan seaside resort.

The 1986 trade balance was in favor of Uruguay, which exported to Hungary wool, leather, and textiles worth $6,282,000, and imported a total $1,123,000 worth of goods from that country.

Holds Talks with Sanguinetti

LD201010 Budapest MTI in English 0820 GMT 20 Nov 87

[Text] Montevideo, November 20 (MTI)—On the first day of the talks between the Hungarian and Uruguayan heads of state, President Julio Sanguinetti termed his country's political relations with Hungary as explicitly good, and Karoly Nemeth invited his host for a visit to Hungary.

The parties to the talks informed each other on the results and problems of the two countries. Karoly Nemeth underlined the world political issues on which the two governments hold identical positions.

President Sanguinetti criticized the protectionist practice in world trade and the subventionary policy of the common market. He announced the ratification of the Hungarian-Uruguayan cultural agreement (the relevant documents are to be exchanged in Montevideo Friday).

Five Hungarian companies—Medicor, Gaz-Mavag, Transelektro, Metrimpex and Budavox—offered business worth 55 million dollars, as well as credit and barter transactions to Uruguayan partners. The Hungarian negotiating group proposed new forms of cooperation (joint production, cooperation on third markets, joint venture business) in order to expand and improve goods exchange. (In 1987 Hungarian exports amounted to 10 million dollars and imports to 1 million.) Karoly Nemeth requested his negotiating partner to help remove administrative obstacles in the way of cooperation between Hungarian and Uruguayan companies.

Foreign Trade Minister Peter Veres is to confer with Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias, and Istvan Doboczky, deputy minister of Agriculture and Food, and Istvan Kortvelyes, deputy minister of Industry, members of Karoly Nemeth's party, with their Uruguayan counterparts on possibilities for the intensification of cooperation.

Visits National Congress

LD201001 Budapest MTI in English 2219 GMT 19 Nov 87

[Text] Montevideo, November 19 (MTI)—Karoly Nemeth, president of the Presidential Council, Thursday arrived in Uruguay, in the late evening hours, Hungarian time. This is the second stop on his South American tour. The president of the Presidential Council and his wife, and the members of his party, were met by Julio Sanguinetti, president of the Republic of Uruguay, and his wife. Also present to meet the president of the Presidential Council were all members of the government, including Foreign Minister Enrique Iglesias.

Following the ceremonious reception, Karoly Nemeth held his first meeting with President of the Republic Julio Sanguinetti in the Libertade Palace.

In the late evening hours, Hungarian time, Karoly Nemeth visited the National Assembly of Uruguay, and delivered a speech to the representatives present for the festive session. He forwarded the greetings and best wishes of the Hungarian people, the National Assembly and the government. Karoly Nemeth spoke about the historical road of Hungary, and its present. He stressed the efforts aimed at developing the democratic way of thinking and the practicing of power, and in close connection with this, the importance of the socialist reform policy of a renewing spirit.

Speaking of the relation between Hungary and Uruguay he quoted: "We live in parts of the world situated far from each other, and work under differing geographic and social conditions. In spite of this, our standpoints and efforts are identical, or stand very near each other in the most important issues that concern the vital interests of the peoples, including the issues related to strengthening world peace and international security, and halting the arms race.

"We follow with attention and highly appreciate the efforts of the much respected president of Uruguay, Julio Sanguinetti, of the government of Uruguay and the legislative body, made in the interest of peace, the development of your region's integration, and for the joint stand to ensure the independent development of the Latin American countries free from external interference. We hold the Uruguayan initiative made to ease, and solve the political and economic problems of the Latin American continent to be important", stressed Karoly Nemeth.

"A country as small as Hungary can best contribute to the maintenance of peace, to improving international relations, if it strives for good relations based on reciprocal advantages with all countries, by respecting their social systems, sovereignty and independence. Our existing relations with the Eastern Republic of Uruguay serve as example to this."

Karoly Nemeth ensured his support to the Uruguayan efforts to establish just international economic and commercial relations. "It is also the fundamental interest of our country to establish a world economic environment which ensures favourable conditions for international economic cooperation of equal rights", he said.

Discussing the Central American situation, Karoly Nemeth said "Together with the Contadora Group, and the member countries of the group supporting it, including the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, we also are of the opinion that the Central American crisis has to be settled in a just way, through negotiations, by respecting the sovereignty, just interests and national dignity of the concerned countries. We support realization of the peace plan which was approved by the heads of states of the region at their recent conference in Guatemala."

At the end of his speech, Karoly Nemeth took a stand for the extension of commercial and economic relations, for developing new forms of cooperation. He voiced his conviction that progress can be made with common efforts in technical and scientific, and cultural cooperation, and also in the fields of education, sports and tourism.

President Sanguinetti and his wife hosted a reception in honour of Karoly Nemeth and his wife, Friday dawn, Hungarian time.

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